

THE POST-UNGA 2026 WORLD REPORT

When Consequences Cross Borders Faster Than Coordination

The Inevitable Multipolar World Needs to Define Coherent & Responsible Sovereignty Without Fence Sitting

Author | Document Control | September 2026
DT TRIO LABS @ GVLN Peaceland, Inc. (dba KXB BIOVERSE)
Primary Source Archive:
KXB Bioverse Systems-Level Public Repository

<https://www.7girgoldenbridge.com/> <https://www.kxbbioverse.com/>



A question being asked:

What Kind of Operating Architecture Does an Increasingly Volatile and Fragmented World Actually Require When Consequences Cross Borders faster than coordination?

20 years in the making,

Humanity 7.0 = Interoperable Sovereignty · वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्–

One Earth Across Sovereign Border Lines

The Global Operational Standards Architecture

*Powered by **7GIR-OS** (operating system + Integration + Synchronization) + **G-Trade** (finance) + **GCIGS** (governance + council) + **BIOME** (human dignity + cultural + experiential)*

Emerged As The Frontrunner

against a gap with no equivalent working architecture

CONTENTS

Chapter 1 - Why This Report : The Coherence Deficit	Page 4
Chapter 2 - UNGA 2026 – The World Speaks	Page 8
Chapter 3 - The World As Is - Outside The Room: The Risk Environment	Page 15
Chapter 4 - The Decade of Human Achievement	Page 22
Chapter 5 - The New World of Superintelligence And Multipolarity	Page 25
Chapter 6 - Humanity 7.0 - The Proposed Architecture	Page 26
Chapter 7 - Operational Integration Of The Proposed Architecture	Page 28
Chapter 8 - SITREP Applied To Four Crossings	Page 29
Chapter 9 - Annextures	Page 38
A. SITREP 2026	Page 38
B. Humanity 7.0 abridged	Page 43
C. The Evidential Vault (193 + 5) 198 UNGA 2026 voices	Page 44
D. The Seven-Domain Search	Page 83
E. The Decade Of Secretarial Diagnostics	Page 89
F. Additional Sources, Disclaimers, Acknowledgements	Page 89
Chapter 10. Closing and Thank You Note	Page 90

CHAPTER 1 - WHY THIS REPORT

The Coherence Deficit: A 360-Degree Spatial Audit

Primary Sources: *The Coherence Deficit & SITREP 2026*

(https://www.kxbbioverse.com/_files/ugd/3c4714_6e35e425cc29471989e9c6397a347f70.pdf)

UNLIKE ANY YEAR IN THE RECENT PAST, 2026 HOLDS PROGRESS AND WRECKAGE IN THE SAME PICTURE. IT IS THE EXHIBIT YEAR THE 360-DEGREE WORLD CAMERA.

What standard international reporting consistently misses is the macro-critical reality that cross-border consequences no longer respect the administrative boundaries of the rooms built to manage them. A localized war in one geography instantly reprices energy grids, maritime shipping lanes, grain corridors, and insurance premiums in another. A national tariff or an export control measure rapidly rewires entire global supply networks. Strategic energy reserves are released while a vital maritime strait remains contested; global trade volumes expand while the legal basis of national measures fractures; localized peace texts are signed while operational verification arrives too late or fails entirely. The contemporary world is institutionally dense yet operationally segmented - a severe, structural coherence deficit.

Most official international reports stay inside one room. The WTO writes trade. The IMF writes money. The IEA writes energy. The UN writes peace, development and humanitarian work. Each can be competent inside its mandate and still miss the event that is no longer inside that mandate.

This report exists to look at that crossing and beyond. It is organized by consequence, not institutional turf. A war in one geography reprices energy, shipping, grain and insurance in others. A national tariff rewires several supply chains. A financial decision in one center changes liquidity and currency exposure in another. A pathogen, a model weight, or a cable cut does not wait for the competent committee to convene.

The contemporary world is already organized through sovereign states, specialized institutions, treaties, markets, infrastructure and tightly coupled technologies. Those arrangements produced extraordinary trade, mobility, finance, communication and development. The same coupling now transmits disruption through the same pipes that transmit opportunity. Interdependence is not a slogan. It is a transmission system. The missing piece is an operating protocol at the point where a consequence leaves the room in which it began. That missing piece is the coherence deficit.

The governing question of this report is narrow, testable, and urgent: does a working mechanism exist - anywhere in the current international system - that can reliably act when a consequence crosses the border of the state, sector, or institution where it began? Not a mechanism on paper. One that functions at the moment it is needed, regardless of which state is involved.

Tested across seven domains - peace and security, trade, sanctions and export controls, climate, health, education, and global poverty - the historical record reveals a recurring defect:

- A nominal mechanism exists on paper.
- The power to compel has been removed, deferred, or omitted.
- Reform thresholds are blocked or left uncleared.
- Workarounds produce administrative process more often than a binding, verifiable result.

Where a mechanism was actually built for the job, coordination moves at speed. The record already shows that contrast: an IEA stock action within eleven days of a Strait of Hormuz closure; a Security Council text on Gaza within five weeks. Beside those sit the other timestamps: a tariff instrument that changed legal basis three times in a few months while multilateral appellate review has been unavailable since December 2019; a peace text whose verification terms arrived weeks later; a roadmap that did not move while famine was confirmed. The point is not the scoreboard of any one file. The point is the pattern. Speed exists inside some rooms. Coherence fails at the crossing.

What the world is lacking outside the hall

Three conditions now sit in the same picture.

Operational segmentation. Mandate-rich machinery, result-poor coupling. The rules that set the pace of response are older than the velocity of the shocks.

Extreme economic divide. The Institute for Economics and Peace puts the economic impact of violence at US\$21.8 trillion in 2025 - 10.5 percent of world output.

Military expenditure absorbs 43 percent of that load. Peacebuilding and peacekeeping absorb about 0.5 percent of military spending. Peacefulness has deteriorated every year since 2014.

UCDP recorded 65 state-involved conflicts in 2025, the highest in a series that begins in 1946 - eight of them interstate, up from two in 2023.

The divide is the split between what the world spends to fight and what it spends to stop fighting; between capitals that can insure a shock and populations that absorb it as hunger, displacement and lost school years.

Multipolar drift. Power has multiplied and unaligned. More centres can veto, delay, duplicate or route around a common procedure. That is a thicker field with fewer shared operating standards. In a multipolar field without interoperability, every crossing becomes a negotiation, and every negotiation arrives after the consequence has already moved.

What the world therefore lacks is not another diagnosis. It lacks a working cross-border protocol that can sit across sovereign lines without abolishing them: sovereignty intact, and still able to act when the event has already left the territory, the sector, or the institution of origin.

Why this report

The existing multilateral architecture has struggled to contain the scale and velocity of global violence because its bounded, institutional rooms are structurally suited to matters that stay inside them, and structurally weak at the crossing where consequences do not. 2026 is not the origin of the deficit. It is the exhibit. Conflict, trade, energy, finance, health, education and technological transformation are interacting across sovereign and institutional boundaries in the same calendar year, in public, at once. That concentration is why the year can be read as a 360-degree camera rather than a single crisis file.

The missing piece is not another academic diagnosis. It is a functioning, cross-border protocol that sits across sovereign lines without abolishing them: sovereignty intact, and capable of a defined response the moment an event leaves its territory of origin. This report offers a candidate operating architecture for that crossing, set out in Chapters 6 through 8.

What the camera also keeps missing is the other half of the record: the human achievement that continues, and is then buried under geopolitical weight. The year is not empty of progress. It is a year in which progress is not permitted to become the story. Capacities are built. They are not allowed to compound. That is the heavier fact this report opens on.

The year ran through three stages that mirror how the world talks to itself.

Davos, January 2026

World Economic Forum, 56th Annual Meeting, theme “A Spirit of Dialogue”; Summer Davos, Dalian, “Innovating at Scale.” Meeting record: weforum.org/meetings/

BRICS

18th BRICS Summit, New Delhi, 12–13 September 2026, “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” New Delhi Declaration as issued by the chair. Record: brics2026.gov.in/

81st UNGA

22–28 September 2026, annual summit. Record: un.org/en/high-level-week-2026. Conflicts, price shocks, and famines do not respect the administrative boundaries of the rooms built to manage them. The structural deterioration of global peacefulness has continued since 2014. *That is the world Chapter 3 goes on to describe outside the room, and the record Chapter 2 sets out from inside it.*

CHAPTER 2

UNGA 2026 - THE WORLD SPEAKS

High-level week is the first evidentiary lens of what the world said about itself, in its own words, in the one room where every sovereign state had its voice on record. The President of the General Assembly is Khalilur Rahman of Bangladesh; it was the final opening address of Secretary-General António Guterres's term, which ends 31 December 2026.

Under the theme *"Restoring trust, managing transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all,"* the assembly served less as a springboard for unified global action and more as a mirror reflecting a deeply fractured world order.

The 81st session of the General Assembly concluded against a backdrop of polarization showcasing the split between diplomatic rhetoric and realities of global conflicts.

Key Outcomes include

Calls for Peace and Action: Closing the debate, General Assembly President Khalilur Rahman noted that world leaders confronted a global landscape defined by active conflicts, stalled development, growing inequality, and rapid technological shifts, while reaffirming that the UN remains an indispensable platform.

Dominant Geopolitical Tensions: The general debate highlighted severe divisions surrounding ongoing global crises, including the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Gaza conflict, and US-Israel-Iran tensions.

Questions on Relevance and Reform: Multiple leaders openly challenged the efficacy of the UN and a deadlocked Security Council in halting contemporary wars. Calls intensified from various member states (including India and African nations) for sweeping reforms, such as permanent seats on the UN Security Council, alongside debates over institutional cost-cutting and future leadership selection as Secretary-General António Guterres prepares to transition out.

Commitment to Cooperation: Despite deep-seated polarization, member states and regional bodies continued to stress the necessity of multilateral cooperation, the UN Charter, and collective frameworks to address climate action, pandemic preparedness, and sustainable development.

The hall did not speak with one mouth. It did speak, repeatedly, to the same pressure: trust thin, crossings live, machinery slower than the shock, human dignity eroding, tolerance diminishing, a stagnant podium and the gap between rhetoric and reality, shadow of unchecked conflict, battle for institutional relevance, shadow of leadership transition and the clamor for reform reaching a crescendo.

The UNGA lens

The roster held 198 entries: 193 member states, the Secretary-General, the President of the Assembly, Palestine as a non-member observer state, the Holy See and the European Union.

The demand for Security Council reform ran across every region and every register. Alexander Stubb of Finland proposed that no single state should hold a veto and independently corroborated the UCDP's count of 65 armed conflicts. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey went further, calling for the veto abolished outright and declaring "the world is bigger than five." Subrahmanyam Jaishankar of India argued that "those most impacted often have the least say" in a system still shaped by 1945, and Ronald Lamola of South Africa, jointly with Brazil, Norway and Spain, pressed for an International Panel on Inequality modelled on the IPCC. Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe placed the same complaint in financial terms: developing countries face a financing gap exceeding \$4 trillion under machinery still built for outdated geopolitical realities of 1945.

Three voices defended the institutions built to hold power accountable, directly answering criticism raised elsewhere in the hall. Rob Jetten of the Netherlands told the Assembly "hands off the ICC," offering to host a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Micheál Martin of Ireland backed the Court in the same terms, warning that what has happened in Gaza "will shame the world" when fully known. Vivian Balakrishnan of Singapore struck a more constructive note, affirming that "the multilateral system... still remains the best way to uphold global peace" even as he pressed for binding AI rules.

On artificial intelligence, the range ran from urgency to caution. Balakrishnan warned that AI capabilities are "developing faster than the world's understanding of the risks." Han Zheng of China took a narrower view, backing reform that would "strengthen - not cut" existing bodies while amplifying the Global South's voice, without touching the Council's permanent structure.

The chokepoint crisis reached the hall from every angle. King Abdullah II of Jordan gave it the sharpest single illustration in the record: "just look at the energy and grocery bills of ordinary families, from Mumbai to Madrid to Minnesota." Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani of Bahrain, whose country led Security Council resolution 2817 on the issue, said the UN needs "not more resolutions, but a greater capacity to implement them." Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia gave the human cost a number: an estimated 40 percent fall in his country's customs revenue, borne by a state with no stake in the conflict at all.

The financial-architecture complaint had its own distinct voices. Mulambo Haimbe of Zambia framed his country's "Grow Zambia Agenda" as investment sought on fair terms, not charity. Mia Mottley of Barbados called the deeper failure "a crisis of responsibility" - not a lack of knowledge, but a failure to act on it - and proposed standing UN mediation teams deployed before conflicts entrench. Philip Davis of the Bahamas put it most starkly: a system where rules bind only the weak "is a hierarchy, not an order," and pressed for reparatory justice alongside it.

Not every complaint pointed the same direction. Janez Janša of Slovenia argued the UN's attention runs unevenly the other way, giving Gaza disproportionate focus while Ukraine, Belarus and Nigeria go comparatively unheard. Vasile Tofan of Moldova, with Russian troops still on Moldovan soil, drew the sharpest line on sovereignty itself: **Countries are not buffer zones. Nations are not bargaining chips.**

Two voices offered something closer to a working answer than a grievance. Espen Barth Eide of Norway named a "triple crisis" - normative, financial, institutional - opening with Gramsci's line that "the old world is dying, and a new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters." Anthony Albanese of Australia, speaking two days after the United States dismissed climate and AI concerns from the same podium, pointed to his own country's under-16 social media law, now followed by more than twenty others, as evidence that governance can still move faster than the problem. Sugiono of Indonesia closed the register on its most measured note: "Indonesia continues to believe in the UN, but believing in the United Nations also means believing that it must evolve with the world it serves."

Decisions that are not carried out. The most repeated complaint concerned execution, not design. The DRC's prime minister said the world needs no new texts, only the implementation of those adopted. Bahrain asked for "not more resolutions, but a greater capacity to implement them." Haiti's prime minister said "a mandate is not enough" for a force still below its planned strength. Barbados called it a failure to convert what is known into what is done. Bolivia, Togo, Rwanda and Uzbekistan made the same point in their own terms.

Who carries the cost. Finance was the second constant. Ghana called the global financial architecture weighted against Africa. Kenya said capital "must price risk. It must not price prejudice." Madagascar, Comoros, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Micronesia and Belize asked that financing follow vulnerability and not income per head. South Africa, with Brazil, Norway and Spain, pressed for an International Panel on Inequality modelled on the IPCC. The Solomon Islands noted that the world spent more than US\$2.9 trillion on militaries last year, sixteen times official development assistance.

The routes trade depends on. The Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea were named by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Djibouti, Yemen, Pakistan, Iraq and Brazil. Oman offered to mediate. Bahrain led Security Council resolution 2817 and tabled a Chapter VII draft on shipping. The cost landed on actors with no part in the fighting: Somalia's president reported a 40 percent fall in customs revenue, the Philippines reported seafarers killed, Iraq proposed energy links to bypass the strait, and Kazakhstan condemned drone attacks on its oil export facilities.

A technology moving faster than its rules. The Secretary-General named artificial intelligence as one of four tests. The Holy See, Austria and Slovakia each objected to lethal decisions delegated to machines. Singapore, the Czech Republic and Greece asked for binding or licensed rules. Albania proposed a compact on sovereign and democratic AI, and Lesotho reported piloting the UN blueprint for national AI and data strategies. Rwanda, Malaysia and Jamaica asked that developing countries help set the rules. Argentina and the United States rejected pre-emptive regulation. Chapter 4 sets out this record.

Small states and the sea. The Assembly adopted a political declaration on sea-level rise the day before Tuvalu's prime minister spoke. Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Fiji, the Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Cabo Verde asked that statehood, borders, maritime zones and UN membership survive rising seas. Older claims surfaced alongside: the Marshall Islands asked for a UN apology for 67 nuclear tests during its trusteeship, Mauritius called Chagos sovereignty non-negotiable, and the Bahamas, Saint Vincent and Belize asked for reparatory justice.

Rules applied unevenly. Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, Cyprus, North Macedonia, Cambodia and the Bahamas said rules apply differently to small and large states. Hungary said allies cannot be held to another standard. Slovenia argued the reverse: that the UN attends to Gaza at the expense of Ukraine, Belarus and Nigeria. Mauritania noted that Palestinians were still refused a seat in the hall.

The wars argued from both sides. The files taken up in **Chapter 7** in this report were each argued in the hall by the parties. Zelenskyy asked that Russia be held responsible and trade with it limited; Lavrov said the operation would be carried through to the end and proposed a new Eurasian security architecture. Netanyahu defended unilateral military action; Abbas said the danger threatens the existence of the Palestinian people and that promised plans had not materialized. Sharif warned that diversion of river waters would be treated as an act of war; Jaishankar named a "serial practitioner of terrorism." Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia described Iranian attacks on Gulf states; Iran's president said Iran is open to dialogue. Armenia and Azerbaijan each described de facto peace since August 2025, and each raised its missing persons.

Moments in the hall. Reports say 77 delegations left during Netanyahu's address; Tonga and Jamaica said they did not walk out. Iceland's foreign minister turned his phrase back on those who refuse to negotiate. Croatia and Serbia contested the same history from the same podium. Belize's prime minister reported an incursion by a Guatemalan military aircraft on 23 September; Guatemala's foreign minister had spoken the day before about the pending ICJ hearing. Australia's prime minister spoke two days after the US president on climate and AI. These are recorded as moments. None changes the pattern.

Not everyone accepted the premise. Argentina called the organization useless. The United States said it cut the UN budget by 15 percent and that there will be no global government. Colombia criticized UN bureaucracy, and Niger rejected outside models of governance. Russia proposed a parallel architecture. Singapore, Indonesia and Gambia defended multilateralism while asking it to evolve.

1. Khalilur Rahman, President of the General Assembly

"Outside these walls, people are not asking whether the United Nations still exists. They are asking whether it works." Trust, he said, is not given. It is earned. Endurance is not enough.

2. António Guterres, Secretary-General

"The fault lines in our world are widening. Cracks have become canyons." He named four tests of power: war and peace; concentrated wealth and inequality; climate and the war on nature; artificial intelligence. Superpowers were told their power is not so super. A Security Council without permanent African representation, he said, is unjust and indefensible.

3. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil

First national speaker, by tradition. The UN, he said, is failing in its mission to spare humanity the scourge of war; credibility has never been so low; "we are all held hostage by the inaction of the Security Council." The Strait of Hormuz had become a trench of war when it should have remained a passage for trade. "Brazil does not fit in anyone's backyard." He also named an unforgivable failure if big technology and AI remain without rules.

4. John Dramani Mahama, President of Ghana

"Security Council reform is not a favor to Africa; it is an imperative for the legitimacy, credibility and survival of the United Nations." The same demand ran through other African statements in the week - Ezulwini, two permanent seats, a Council still cut to 1945.

5. Taneti Maamau, President of Kiribati

On a crossing that is physical: sea and shore. Trust, he said, is not restored by words. It is strengthened through implementation, accountability and results that improve lives. In the same sitting, island states put sea-level rise on the record as an existential load, not a side meeting.

6. Javier Milei, President of Argentina — the adversarial counterweight. Calls the organization "useless," warns of taking the Falklands into Argentina's "own hands." Without this, the chapter reads as if everyone wants the UN fixed; Milei is the one voice saying the premise itself is wrong.

7. Balendra "Balen" Shah, Prime Minister of Nepal — "Glaciers and floods do not travel with a visa stamped on passports." The single most quotable line in the whole vault, and it states this report's own governing thesis in human terms, with over 1,300 dead and Guterres's own unheeded Everest warning as the frame.

8. Cardinal Pietro Parolin, Holy See — AI and lethal autonomous weapons specifically: "the decision to use lethal force cannot be delegated to opaque or automated processes." A non-political-bloc voice, distinct register from Lula's tech complaint.

9. William Ruto, President of Kenya — "Capital must price risk. It must not price prejudice." The sharpest financial-inequality line in the vault, backed by hard numbers (debt at \$102 trillion, 46 countries spending more on debt than classrooms).

10. Mohamad Hasan, Foreign Minister of Malaysia — "We are sick of it." The most visceral single line on veto frustration, paired with a constructive Global South framing ("we must help shape those choices"), giving the chapter genuine emotional range alongside its diplomatic register.

The hall keeps returning to a short list: war that does not end; a Council that does not represent; climate and sea that do not wait; technology that outruns rule; a public that asks whether the house works. Annex C holds all the voices.

Ultimately, UNGA 2026 did not deliver the sweeping breakthroughs required to "restore trust." Instead, it functioned as a vital pressure valve and a sobering reminder that while the United Nations cannot easily stop modern wars, it remains the only global forum where a fractured world still gathers to talk.

On September 22nd, 2026, the United States told the General Assembly it would use "superintelligence" rather than "artificial intelligence"; an executive order to that effect was signed on 29 September. This report records the fact. It does not treat the rename as the definition.

The world outside this room is the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

THE WORLD AS IS - Outside the Room

The Risk Environment

General Assembly gives the world a room in which sovereign nations can speak. Outside that room, consequences continue to move.

Conflicts, rivalry, trade frictions, energy exposure, monetary optionality, and technology acceleration accumulated over years. As sovereign options are widening, operating realities dictates that a localized conflict instantly transforms into active transmission chains. IMF in 2026 characterized the global environment as more fragmented, multipolar setting where largest macro-structural transformations interact. Wars continue while negotiations proceed. Trade continues while tariffs, restrictions and strategic policies alter its pathways. Energy systems remain interconnected through grids, pipelines, shipping routes and critical materials. Food insecurity crosses the boundaries between conflict, agriculture, transport and humanitarian access. Climate impacts intersect with water, infrastructure, migration and public finance. Health and education continue to expand human capability while substantial gaps in access remain.

This chapter is therefore not a counterargument to the voices heard at UNGA 2026. It is the report's second evidentiary lens:

What the world says about itself inside the room must be read beside what the world is actually carrying outside it.

The record is neither one of universal failure nor uninterrupted progress. It is a world in which **resilience and disruption are occurring simultaneously**.

1. Conflict - Consequences Travel Beyond the Battlefield

The global conflict burden remains historically severe. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program recorded **65 state-based armed conflicts in 2025**, the highest number in its dataset beginning in 1946. Eight were interstate conflicts, 13 reached UCDP's threshold for war, and approximately 244,600 people were killed in organized violence during the year.

Those figures describe the kinetic event.

They do not describe its entire consequence.

A modern conflict can become, almost simultaneously:

displacement · humanitarian crisis · energy disruption · shipping disruption · food insecurity · trade disturbance · infrastructure failure · fiscal pressure

The geography of war and the geography of consequence are therefore no longer necessarily the same.

Food insecurity makes that connection particularly visible.

The 2026 Global Report on Food Crises found that acute food insecurity remained widespread during 2025. For the first time in the report's ten-year history, famine was confirmed during the same year in parts of both the Gaza Strip and Sudan, with famine risk continuing in Gaza, Sudan and South Sudan in 2026.

Food itself illustrates why consequences cannot always be managed within one institutional category.

A harvest may be local. The fertilizer may not be. The fuel may not be. The shipping corridor may not be. The financing may not be.

And the humanitarian consequence may move far beyond the geography in which the original disruption began. Conflict therefore demonstrates a recurring condition of the contemporary world: **one event can enter several systems at once.**

2. Economic Interdependence - Resilience Under Strategic Pressure

The world economy remains deeply interconnected.

World merchandise-trade volume grew 4.6 percent in 2025. The WTO's March 2026 baseline projected slower but still positive merchandise-trade growth of 1.9 percent in 2026. Total world goods and services trade reached approximately \$34.65 trillion in 2025.

That is not the profile of a global economy that has ceased to function.

But the conditions under which economic interaction occurs are becoming more complex.

Tariffs, export controls, national-security measures, industrial policy and supply-chain realignment can affect sourcing, investment and production networks far beyond the jurisdiction in which a particular measure originates.

Trade can therefore remain resilient in aggregate while the routes, rules and strategic calculations surrounding it become less settled.

Finance presents a related challenge. National currencies remain national. Financial institutions remain differently regulated. Payment systems and settlement infrastructures remain institutionally distinct. Yet international commerce requires those environments to interact continuously.

The emerging challenge is therefore not simply whether one financial or trading system will replace another. It is how **multiple systems can coexist and transact without requiring political, monetary or institutional uniformity**. The world economy increasingly presents an interoperability problem: **different systems, continuing economic interaction**.

3. Physical Systems - Energy, Climate, Food and Oceans

Some of the world's most consequential systems are physical before they are political.

Energy: Energy illustrates this directly. Electricity generation cannot be separated from transmission, grid stability, storage, maintenance, financing, critical materials and complementary capacity. Renewable generation has expanded rapidly, but variable sources such as wind and solar require increasingly flexible grids, storage, transmission and other balancing resources. **At the same time**, the technologies supporting that integration continue to improve. IRENA reports that the installed cost of utility-scale battery-storage systems fell **93 percent between 2010 and 2024**, from \$2,571 per kilowatt-hour to \$192 per kilowatt-hour. Hybrid renewable-and-storage systems are increasingly being deployed to improve reliability and grid balancing. **The relevant question is therefore not simply whether one energy technology succeeds or fails**. It is whether the **whole energy system**—generation, transmission, storage, resources, maintenance and infrastructure—is coherent enough to deliver reliable energy. Physical chokepoints reveal another dimension of that interdependence. **In 2025, an average of approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day**, around one quarter of global seaborne oil trade, moved through the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 19 percent of global LNG trade also transited the Strait. **A narrow physical corridor can therefore carry economic consequences for countries thousands of miles away**. Energy is simultaneously: infrastructure · trade · national security · industrial capacity · and human necessity.

Climate and Adaptation: Climate presents a similar systems problem.

Heat, drought, flooding, water stress and sea-level rise intersect with agriculture, health, infrastructure, insurance, migration and public finance. International climate mechanisms have expanded substantially, but adaptation capacity remains highly uneven. UNEP estimates that developing countries will require approximately \$310–365 billion annually for climate adaptation by 2035. International public adaptation-finance flows to developing countries were approximately \$26 billion in 2023—placing estimated needs at roughly 12 to 14 times current flows.

The important condition is not that climate governance is absent.

It is the continuing gap between:

recognition and capacity, planning and financing, global exposure and local ability to absorb the consequence.

The physical environment does not organize itself according to ministerial boundaries.

Climate pressure can become agricultural pressure.

Agricultural pressure can become food pressure.

Food pressure can become economic and humanitarian pressure.

That is precisely the systems interaction this chapter is intended to expose.

Food

Food security sits at the intersection of many of these same systems.

It depends upon:

agriculture · water · energy · fertilizer · transport · trade · currency stability · conflict conditions · humanitarian access · household purchasing power

Food security is therefore not merely an agricultural issue.

It is an operating condition produced by several systems functioning together.

Oceans and the Blue Economy

The ocean presents perhaps the clearest physical example of multiple institutional domains occupying one continuous environment.

Oceans carry maritime trade.

They provide food through fisheries.

They support tourism and coastal livelihoods.

They host energy infrastructure.

They carry communications cables.

Ports connect maritime systems to inland logistics, industry and population centers. Coastal communities simultaneously confront environmental and climate pressures. UN Trade and Development estimates that trade in ocean-related goods and services exceeded **\$2.5 trillion in 2025**, with services accounting for most of that trade.

The blue economy is therefore not merely an environmental category. It occupies the intersection of: trade + food + infrastructure + climate + energy + sovereignty + human livelihood.

For coastal and island societies, those relationships are not theoretical. They are central to economic and national life.

Across energy, climate, food and oceans, the recurring reality is the same:

the physical system can already be integrated even when the institutions responsible for its different parts are not.

4. Human Capability - Health and Education

The world outside the room is also the other side of the same world of substantial human progress. Health systems have expanded. Education has reached populations on an unprecedented scale in earlier generations. Scientific and technological capability continues to grow. But access remains uneven.

Health

WHO and the World Bank report that global access to essential health services has improved over time. Yet an estimated 4.6 billion people lacked full coverage of essential health services in 2023, while 2.1 billion people experienced financial hardship from out-of-pocket health spending in 2022.

Health is not simply a domestic social-service category. And it is not the absence of diseases as they cross borders today.

Medicines and medical supply chains cross borders. Health professionals migrate.

Research, vaccines, diagnostics and health information move internationally.

Health capacity therefore intersects with economic resilience, mobility, productivity and human security.

Education

Education presents a comparable dual reality.

UNESCO reports that approximately **1.4 billion students were enrolled in school in 2024**, reflecting major long-term expansion. Yet approximately **273 million children and young people remained out of school**, and progress in reducing exclusion has slowed significantly since 2015. Education is more than a social indicator.

True education is the hallmark to RAISE THE BAR for responsible citizenship and wealthy societies: Where able governance with flourished trade and intelligent people maintain the equilibrium of man-made advancements with the available abundance of natural resources for healthy Planet.

It determines how societies absorb technology, develop skilled workforces, sustain research, increase productivity and distribute opportunity.

Health and education therefore belong to the operating capacity of societies themselves.

They are part of global resilience.

And where access remains inadequate, they are part of structural vulnerability.

One World Under Simultaneous Load

The world outside the room is therefore not one story.

It is several realities occurring simultaneously.

Conflict has intensified while the global economy has demonstrated considerable resilience.

Trade continues while strategic economic friction changes its pathways.

Energy systems are transitioning while remaining constrained by physical infrastructure and geography.

Climate planning is expanding while adaptation capacity remains uneven.

Global food systems connect local agriculture to international energy, finance, logistics and conflict.

A multi-trillion-dollar ocean economy connects trade, food, communications, energy and coastal societies.

Health and education continue advancing while substantial human-capability gaps remain.

The international environment itself is also changing. In July 2026, the IMF described global order becoming **more fragmented and multipolar**, while emphasizing that the world economy had remained remarkably resilient. It also noted that major geopolitical, technological and economic transformations are occurring simultaneously and interacting with one another.

That combination matters. Systems are still working. Trade still moves. Institutions still coordinate. Technology still advances.

Energy systems continue evolving. Health and education continue improving lives. Capital continues crossing borders.

The conclusion is therefore not that every existing institution has failed. Nor is it that the world lacks functioning systems. The condition is more specific: systems which remain separately organized are increasingly exposed to consequences that arrive together.

War becomes energy.

Energy becomes prices.

Prices become food insecurity.

Trade becomes supply-chain strategy.

Climate becomes infrastructure and mobility pressure.

Health becomes economic resilience.

Education becomes technological capability.

Oceans become trade, food, climate and sovereignty simultaneously.

The world is interconnected not because every nation has chosen political integration, but because **consequence itself has become interconnected.**

That is **The World As Is.**

And one technological capability is now moving through almost every one of these systems with unusual speed, scale and reach.

It deserves examination on its own terms that found a new identity and a new name that just entered the world which we are defining in

Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4

THE DECADE OF HUMAN ACHIEVEMENT

Artificial intelligence included - the name that stayed for decades

This chapter records what the decade actually put into the world. It is not a claim that every laboratory hope became infrastructure. Institutional rooms fractured while capability compounded. The deficit is not a shortage of tools. It is a shortage of a stable crossing on which those tools can be hosted.

1. Compute and artificial intelligence Protein-structure prediction moved from a slow experimental craft to a computational one. The AlphaFold Protein Structure Database, hosted by EMBL-EBI, holds predicted structures across the human proteome and related sets, with confidence that varies by residue and by protein.

Machine systems moved from narrow pattern-matching to tools that draft code, text, image, and operating procedures inside limits set by their builders. They remained tools. They did not become sovereigns. The governance record of that capability - the range of positions at the 81st session, the Security Council briefing of 23 September 2026, and the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, opened for signature on 5 September 2024 and not yet in force - is the institutional half of the same decade. Capability arrived before a binding standard.

Quantum machines demonstrated advantage on narrow tasks. They did not become a general replacement for classical machines, and they did not break deployed cryptography.

2. Life sciences

Programmable gene editing left the purely experimental column. Therapies for sickle-cell disease and beta-thalassemia received major-market authorization in this decade; trial registrations and outcomes sit on ClinicalTrials.gov. Authorization of a therapy is not a claim that every congenital disease now has a cure.

Synthetic mRNA, with lipid-nanoparticle delivery, gave public-health systems a platform that could be redesigned against a new pathogen faster than the egg-based systems it sat beside. The World Health Organization R&D Blueprint is one coordination record of that outbreak work. The platform's history is wider than any single archive.

Early brain-computer implants entered clinical study and, in a small number of cases, restored a channel of digital control to people who had lost it. That is an early clinical fact. It is not yet a settled restoration of autonomy for a population.

Cellular-reprogramming studies moved aging-related markers in tissue experiments. No population-level extension of healthy lifespan is established.

3. Energy and materials

Utility-scale battery costs fell by roughly an order of magnitude across the 2010s and early 2020s. The series is IRENA's renewable-cost database; any percentage printed here should name the start year, the end year, and that series.

Laser inertial-confinement experiments, notably at the National Ignition Facility, achieved scientific energy gain and repeated it.

Magnetic-confinement fusion did not become a stable, repeatable operating power source in this decade. It remains an engineering program.

Advanced membranes, including graphene designs, improved desalination in pilots. They did not remake water supply for arid coasts.

4. Orbit and connection

Reusable orbital rockets turned some launch from a single-use event into a repeated logistics run. Flight and recovery records are the launch provider's manifest and NASA's launch records. Cost-per-kilogram claims belong to those manifests, not to a planetary-science laboratory.

Low-Earth-orbit constellations extended broadband to places fiber had not reached. Coverage is not the same as universal service.

Space observatories, above all the James Webb Space Telescope, returned infrared views of early galaxies and exoplanet atmospheres that ground telescopes could not take.

5. The balance sheet beside the tools

The same decade expanded gross global debt. Public and private series are in the IMF Global Debt Database. A single world stock in the \$300–365 trillion range, if cited, belongs to the Institute of International Finance Global Debt Monitor, not to an IMF headline. The mismatch is the point: tools accelerated; public balance sheets did not acquire an operating protocol at the crossing.

What this chapter does not claim: It does not claim that international coordination on these tools is impossible. A treaty exists and is short of the ratifications that would bring it into force. A Council briefing was held and did not become a resolution. It does not claim that the architecture in Chapter 6 is already deployed. It claims that the decade produced real capability, and that capability still arrives at a border where no common operating protocol is in force.

Sources Readers can check the direction of this decade in these repositories. A repository is a place to look. It is not proof of every sentence above.

Proteomics — AlphaFold Protein Structure Database, EMBL-EBI.

Gene-editing trials — ClinicalTrials.gov.

Outbreak R&D — World Health Organization R&D Blueprint.

Battery and renewable costs — IRENA renewable-cost series.

Debt series — IMF Global Debt Database; gross world stock, if printed, Institute of International Finance Global Debt Monitor.

Launch and orbit — NASA launch records and commercial flight manifests.

Fusion experiments — National Ignition Facility public results.

AI treaty — Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence (CETS 225).

Where a primary series is named, the figure follows that series. Where it is not, the sentence records direction, not a measured result.

A Foundational Vision for the Next Century Silently Took Shape Over Two Decades

A foundational vision for the next century took shape over two decades A vault is already built and waiting for physical adoption.

Humanity 7.0 is the standalone interoperable architecture submitted to carry human capability and dignity across sovereign border lines:

7GIR-OS for operation, integration, and synchronization; G-Trade for settlement; GCIGS for governance and council; BIOME for lived conditions. It is ready to be built in the world. **Humanity 7.0 = Interoperable Sovereignty = वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्**

One earth across sovereign border lines.

From time to time in the history of revolutions, discoveries and or a few people with determined strength and grit have stood to present agendas for future generations, rebuilding the societal and administrative architecture of their times. **Humanity 7.0 = Interoperable**

Sovereignty · वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् - One Earth Across Sovereign Border Lines seems to be their torchbearers, continuing that legacy for the centuries ahead.

CHAPTER 5

THE NEW WORLD OF SUPERINTELLIGENCE – MULTIPOLARITY

Three defining trends are emerging today.

Over a decade organized itself, in public conversation, around that one unnamed capability found its ground to be called **Superintelligence**. Simultaneously, geopolitical turbulence is expressing itself in a drift of **Multipolarity** in the world. **Multipolarity** demands coherence, human dignity, operational synchronization, frictionless cross-border trade, and dual-core governance standards - for domestic and global peace.

Superintelligence is the convergence of functional frameworks of governance, operational realities of trade and human achievements in a multipolar sovereign world. Coherence is the other word for superintelligence

Multipolarity is not a battlefield of rival centers. It is a condition of several capable authorities that can remain several - and still operate as one earth. It holds superintelligence as an integrated ecosystem of responsible sovereignty: operational systems that stay in synchronization, trade that can clear across borders and asset classes, human dignity that remains readable in lived conditions, and governance that is dual-core - self-governed at each sovereign seat, and bound to interoperable standards no single nation, machine, or institutional room owns. **Coherence comes from that integration.**

And the architecture submitted for that condition is **Chapter 6**. The tool remains a tool. Human and sovereign responsibility remains non-transferable. **Humanity 7.0 = Interoperable Sovereignty · वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् One earth across sovereign border lines is the name of that coherent architecture powered by globally operational universal standards.**

Enter

Humanity 7.0 = Interoperable Sovereignty · वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्-

ONE EARTH ACROSS SOVEREIGN BORDER LINES

the global operational standards architecture

Global Operational Standards Architecture

Powered by 7GIR-OS (operating system + Integration + Synchronization) + G-Trade (finance) + GCIGS (governance + council) + BIOME (human dignity + cultural + experiential)

A Civilizational Ecosystem

A CATEGORY CREATING ENTITY

MULTI SECTORAL & MULTI STAKEHOLDER

Interoperable Sovereignty for an Interdependent Civilization

Borders do not have to be erased for the world to operate across them. Nations stay sovereign. Mandates stay with the institutions that hold them. What has to integrate is the interface - where trade, energy, finance, technology, health and conflict already leave the room in which they began.

Name	Role
GCIGS + GCIGS	Dual core. Governance protocols and governance council. Council members drawn from each nation; dual role — hold the Council, and oversee domestic implementation through DoNB.
DoNB	Department of Nation Building. Executes the GCIGS protocols inside that state, under that state's authority.
7GIR-OS	Operating system + operational integration + synchronization fabric.
G-Trade	Cross-border economic layer. Conversion, settlement, trade compliance.
BIOME	Human experiential layer.

<https://www.kxbbioverse.com/post/technology-for-global-peace-gcigs-the-grand-synthesis-engineering-coherence-for-humanity-7-0-techn>
<https://www.kxbbioverse.com/post/technology-for-global-peace-series-finale-building-the-foundations-of-a-coherent-civilization-com>

CHAPTER 7

OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

How the Proposed Architecture gets Integrated

The Multilateral & Multidimensional Framework for Systemic Synchronization

The **ecosystem of Humanity 7.0** operates as a single integrated mechanism precisely because no one of its four layers is asked to do the others' job. **7GIR-OS** carries the multidimensional operational physical and digital crossings - infrastructure, transit, compute, communication - recording what happens and synchronizing it across participating systems. **G-Trade** carries the financial crossing, settling value across fiat, crypto, energy, hydrocarbon, and gold so that payment rails cannot be weaponized in isolation. **GCIGS** carries the governing crossing: the dual-core protocol-and-council layer that confers authority, sets verification standards, and applies the consequence a protocol has already named - nothing in the stack acts before GCIGS has conferred the authority to act. And **BIOME** carries the human crossing, the test that keeps the other three honest by asking whether health, schooling, mobility, and civic life actually move, because an architecture that performs technically while the lived condition stays unchanged has not integrated anything. These are not four independent systems operating in parallel: each addresses a different function of the same crossing, allowing infrastructure, trade, governance and human experience to remain synchronized without transferring sovereign authority to a single nation, institution or machine. each addresses a different function and each layer depends on the others to mean anything at all: a recorded disruption with no governing protocol to invoke is just data; a governing protocol with no infrastructure layer to apply it to is just a document; and a system that synchronizes finance and infrastructure while human dignity stays unread is coherence in name only. That interdependence is what makes it a superintelligent mechanism and not a list - adopted where a sovereign chooses to adopt it,. Humanity 7.0 is the integrated operating mechanism submitted for a world in which consequences already cross borders faster than the rooms built to manage them. **Human and sovereign responsibility remains non-transferable. Humanity 7.0 = Interoperable Sovereignty = वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्**
One earth across sovereign border lines.

CHAPTER 8

SITREP APPLIED TO FOUR CROSSINGS

These measures are a bridge. They expire for a file when GCIGS is adopted and implementation-ready. The handoff is stated at the close of this chapter.

Conflict-Resolution Protocols and Flashpoint Interventions

This chapter applies the stabilization, de-escalation and neutral-corridor methods set out in SITREP 2026 ([Annex A](#)) to four distinct crossings, extended with sovereign requirement declarations, verification standards, and recurrence-prevention design. Chapters [8.1](#) and [8.2](#) are full protocols; [8.3](#) and [8.4](#) are abstracts.

8.0 Governing Rule of Authority and Responsibility

The case studies in this chapter are Human - AI - Machine (HAM) Team applications of the SITREP architecture. They distinguish three sources of authority and do not mix their tenses:

Existing institutional authority - authority presently established under applicable legal and institutional frameworks.

Proposed settlement terms - HAM candidate interventions, expressly identified as proposals: SITREP proposes

Conferred authority - authority that would arise only through sovereign agreement and adoption of the relevant architecture: “under an adopted GCIGS, G-Trade or 7GIR-OS framework Sovereignty preserves each nation’s authority to accept, reject, amend or propose an alternative. It does not extinguish responsibility for cross-border consequences arising from sovereign conduct, nor for outcomes a sovereign asks the international community to help produce.

Sovereign Adoption; Binding Participation. Adoption is an exercise of sovereign authority. Upon adoption and entry, the applicable protocols become binding conditions of participation. Participation does not permit selective compliance with the responsibilities, verification requirements, consequences or restoration pathways established by the adopted framework.

Authority Precedes Enforcement. Evidence establishes what occurred; verification determines whether an agreed threshold has been met; the institution or mechanism authorized under the adopted framework applies the consequence established by that protocol, with a named decision-maker or body of record; verified correction then activates the corresponding restoration pathway. No consequence in this chapter is self-executing without an identified authorizing act.

Monitoring Obstruction. Where monitoring access has been authorized under the applicable protocol, obstruction of that access constitutes an independent protocol violation and activates the consequence established for that violation. It does not itself prove the underlying allegation, which remains subject to its own evidentiary standard.

Scope of Financial Consequence. Any financial or clearing consequence described in this chapter operates within the participating architecture - G-Trade, its settlement rails, and the parties' own conditional relief terms. This chapter does not claim authority over SWIFT or any other independent financial-messaging system, which HAM neither owns nor controls; nor does it claim to bypass the Security Council or any veto. Where an existing sanction is referenced, its removal or reinstatement is an act of the authority that imposed it, exercised on the conditional terms that authority itself set.

No protocol exercises authority that has not first been conferred. No participant receives the benefits of an integrated system while selectively disregarding the responsibilities that make that system function.

8.0.1 From No-Man's Land to the Neutral Parcel

SITREP 2026 (Annex A) proposed a No-Man's Land Declaration for whole conflict zones. Applied literally, it asks parties to extinguish their claims, leaves populated land without an owner, and relies on GCIGS in full deployment, which is not yet in force. This chapter narrows that idea into an instrument that can actually be agreed: the Neutral Parcel - a named site, not a whole territory, entered by consent, with claims reserved rather than extinguished.

Feature	Annex A: Original Declaration	Chapter 7: HAM Neutral Parcel
Scope	Whole conflict zone.	A named parcel where claims cannot be reconciled and both parties consent (e.g. holy sites, nuclear facilities, critical shipping lanes).
Claims	Extinguished (“no future claim”).	Reserved on every side; nothing in the arrangement prejudices final political or sovereign status.
Populated land	Vacant.	Residents, worship, and lawful daily life continue under rules agreed by the parties.
Development	None.	No construction or change to the parcel’s status; maintenance, heritage and humanitarian works permitted.
Duration	Permanent.	Fixed term, renewable, with a scheduled review.
Governing body	GCIGS (full deployment).	Existing UN bodies and agencies, with the parties’ consent, transitioning to a GCIGS role only once adopted.
Consent	Declared.	Agreed by the parties; the General Assembly may recommend the framework but cannot impose it.

8.1 Russia–Ukraine Conflict Resolution Protocol

Status: Process protocol, applying the governing rule of 7.0 throughout.

1. Circulation - the Black Sea

Structural gap: sovereignty without circulation - political control over borders chokes physical shipping and transport lanes that neither party solely owns.

SITREP proposes a Black Sea passage corridor defined by fixed coordinates, drawing on the operating pattern of the 2022–23 grain initiative. Under an adopted protocol, vessels register through an agreed manifest system; a verified kinetic act within the corridor is treated as an unprovoked violation, and the parties' own agreed authority (not an automatic global rule) suspends the violating party's port-access privileges within the adopted system.

2. Human dignity - exchanges

Structural gap: security without dignity - populations absorbed by displacement and detention with no reliable return channel.

SITREP proposes a single ICRC-verified exchange interface for prisoners, detainees, and children, with full pre-registration of names. Under an adopted protocol, a party that delays or denies access to an agreed exchange coordinate commits an independent violation of the access term - which triggers its own stated consequence - without that obstruction itself deciding the separate, underlying question of the exchange dispute.

3. Financial ownership - sanctions relief

Structural gap: aid without ownership - relief and funding with no link to verified performance.

SITREP proposes that any sanctions relief a state or bloc chooses to extend be made expressly conditional on 30-day verified performance milestones. Under those terms - set by the sanctioning authority itself, not imposed on it - a verified breach reinstates the relief-granting authority's own prior measures, on the schedule that authority agreed to when it granted relief. This is the sanctioning party's own conditional act, not a claim of power over the Security Council or any other body.

4. Physical systems - Zaporizhzhia

Structural gap: territory without infrastructure continuity - critical utilities used as tactical leverage.

SITREP proposes the Zaporizhzhia plant site as a Neutral Parcel: territorial claims remain frozen and reserved, and administrative and physical-security authority over the site is placed with the IAEA, under an adopted settlement both parties agree to. Local technical staff continue operating the plant under IAEA protection; a verified military incursion suspends the region's agreed energy-transmission allowances under that same settlement.

8.2 Israel–Palestine Conflict Resolution Protocol

Status: Candidate framework, expressly a HAM / SITREP proposal.

This pack assigns ground, doors and duties. It does not write friendship, and it does not claim an authority the Assembly does not have. Every territorial and governance term below is a HAM proposal, not a UN act.

HAM proposes a settlement under which the Assembly recommends recognition of the State of Palestine, including Gaza, and under which - through the parties' own adoption of this settlement, not by UN decree - the West Bank is divided into two parts of equal land area, one to that State, one to Israel. Households on either half stay in place and keep their own citizenship, Palestinian and Israeli alike; there is no relocation to match a flag.

Israel's capital in this proposal is the city Israel has run on the 1948 side of the 1967 line. After this sentence, the proposal calls it Israel's capital, not a contested name.

East Jerusalem, including the holy basin, is proposed as a Neutral Parcel: no exclusive national prize, claims reserved on every side. Residents already there stay; worship doors stay with the families and communities that already keep them. Fabric and hours are proposed under UNESCO, transitioning to a GCIGS verification role only once that architecture is adopted by the parties. Emergency security administration is proposed under an agreed international mechanism operating pursuant to authority the settlement itself would confer - not a claim that such a mechanism currently exists. On the Haram, the proposal is that Jordan and Israel step back from exclusive custodial control in favor of an agreed international arrangement, with Muslim worship practice continuing without interruption.

Hamas is proposed as a domestic file of the Palestinian state after recognition, not a second party at the table and not a stand-in for Gaza's two million residents.

Entry to this proposal's trade-and-talks circle carries the duty attached to it. Isolation from that circle is the last rung of a ladder applied only after a party has entered and then refused its obligations - never the first step and never aimed at civilians. Passages, pause hours and a care floor travel with the proposal from the start; a flag without trucks is a nameplate, not a settlement.

Stabilization terms proposed under this settlement

1. Circulation - Gaza's passages

SITREP proposes published daily hours for Gaza's entry lanes, including Egypt's own crossing on Egypt's own terms, with manifest validation through an agreed system. A verified, unscheduled kinetic act inside an agreed corridor shifts the burden of proof, under the settlement's own evidentiary rule, to the party responsible for that territory.

2. Human dignity - the care floor

SITREP proposes a published minimum for electricity, water, clinics and rubble clearance, with technical observers given agreed access to verify it. Blocking an inspector for more than the agreed window is an independent violation under this settlement's own terms, pausing the specific reconstruction financing tied to that violation - not a general legal finding against the host party.

3. Financial ownership - a lawful monopoly on force

SITREP proposes that the recognized Palestinian state hold a lawful monopoly on force, with armed non-state factions bound to a dated, verified timeline for surrender of heavy weaponry and registration under neutral custody, agreed by the parties. Missing an agreed milestone pauses the specific phase of resource allocation tied to it, under the settlement's own terms - not an automatic claim on funds HAM does not control.

4. Physical systems - the dividing line

SITREP proposes that the West Bank's equal-area division be drawn by a UN cartographer, straight wherever the land allows, with a written reason recorded for any deviation. Where a dead-straight line is not physically possible because of terrain or dense settlement,

the proposal allows a Neutral Transit Buffer - a specific application of the Neutral Parcel principle set out in 7.0.1, not a revival of a whole-zone No-Man's Land.

The Neutral Transit Buffer

Where the cartographer finds a straight cut impossible, the line splits into two parallel boundaries with a corridor between them. Its land area is deducted symmetrically from both sides' totals so the 50/50 division holds. Under this proposal:

Neither state holds title, military rights, or policing authority inside the buffer; claims on both sides are reserved, not extinguished.

No construction, fortification, or settlement expansion is permitted inside it.

Physical access, counter-smuggling monitoring, and safety are managed by an agreed UN peacekeeping or observer presence for as long as that presence is needed.

Only once the parties have adopted the relevant architecture would monitoring transition toward a 7GIR-OS-supported passage system; a verified unauthorized crossing would then activate a consequence within that adopted system, applied by its named operating authority - not an unattended automatic freeze.

8.3 India - Pakistan Conflict Resolution Protocol

Status: Abstract, applying the governing rule of 7.0.

Circulation (the Line of Control). SITREP proposes locking the LoC's current position and reclassifying it as a Symmetric Transit Interface, with family reunification and licensed trade on fixed hours through an agreed tracking system - a bilateral mechanism the two states would have to adopt, not an existing arrangement.

Physical systems (the Indus Waters). SITREP proposes that diversion or unilateral restriction of river flow by either riparian party be treated, under an adopted protocol, as the gravest category of violation. Technical monitoring of flow and dam telemetry is proposed to a joint panel with World Bank participation, with the infrastructure treated as a Neutral Parcel. A verified violation would activate a consequence within the bilateral economic-clearing arrangement the two states themselves adopt - not a claim on any third-party financial system.

Human dignity (cross-border proxy conduct). SITREP proposes that hosting non-state armed actors engaged in cross-border action be treated as a protocol failure once a state has adopted this framework. Under that adopted protocol, a hosting jurisdiction that delays or restricts monitors' access to a launch or command site independently violates the access term, which activates its own stated consequence within the adopted system - without that obstruction alone deciding the separate, underlying attribution question.

8.4 Israel–United States–Iran Conflict Resolution Protocol

Status: Abstract, applying the governing rule of 7.0.

Circulation (the Strait of Hormuz). SITREP proposes the Strait as a Sovereign Maritime Corridor with claims frozen and shipping and LNG lanes defined by fixed coordinates. Within the participating G-Trade system - not as a claim over global commerce - a verified act such as mining, drone deployment, or unauthorized seizure inside the corridor would activate the settlement's named authority to suspend the offending party's access to that system's commercial and energy clearing.

Physical systems (nuclear facilities). SITREP proposes that regional enrichment facilities operate under an IAEA custody protocol, with technical sensors feeding a monitoring stream. Obstruction of that monitoring, once agreed, is an independent violation of the access term. Any resulting reinstatement of sanctions is the act of whichever party or parties hold the authority to impose them, exercised on the conditional terms they themselves set when granting relief - not a claim of power over the Security Council or over SWIFT.

Financial ownership (proxy conduct). SITREP proposes that state support for regional non-state militias be tracked against defined, verified milestones. A verified proxy strike traced to a known affiliate would, within the adopted G-Trade architecture specifically, restrict the responsible state's access to clearing lines tied to its own hydrocarbon and gold exports - a consequence inside the system HAM's architecture actually operates, not a claim on any external financial-messaging network.

8.5 The SITREP Challenge

The international community may accept, amend, reject or replace the candidate interventions presented in this chapter. Rejection does not extinguish the underlying responsibility to address the cross-border consequences identified in each case.

Where an alternative is preferred, the functional test remains the same: What outcome is sought? What mechanism can produce it? Where does its authority originate? How is performance independently verified? What consequence follows verified non-performance? What restores standing after verified correction?

These case studies are not presented as an entitlement to agreement. They are presented as candidate mechanisms for examination. Test them. Stress them. Identify their failure points. Improve them. Where a stronger mechanism exists, replace them with something stronger.

What cannot substitute for resolution is the repeated recognition of a problem without a functioning mechanism for addressing it. A demand for functioning international order carries a corresponding responsibility to participate in building, improving, or identifying the mechanisms capable of producing it.

The standard is therefore not agreement with HAM. The standard is whether the proposed or alternative mechanism can produce the stated outcome under identifiable authority, verifiable performance, defined consequence, and a credible restoration pathway. Rejection of a HAM candidate intervention does not constitute resolution of the underlying problem.

This situational report presents these conflict resolutions that are well suited for the current geopolitical conditions. The steps in this chapter are a bridge, not a standing order. They apply only until GCIGS is adopted by the parties to a file and is implementation-ready through each participating state's Department of Nation Building. On that date, for that file, these interim steps expire. Verification, restriction, restoration, and settlement move to the adopted GCIGS protocol. What does not expire is the road rule: domestic law at home; shared constraints only on the two-way crossing; conduct tied to access; access restored when the breach is mended and verified. Nothing in this chapter authorizes the current process to continue by default, and nothing in it claims that a seated council abolishes the border or the conflict. It claims a handoff, and a date after which the bridge is no longer the road.

CHAPTER 9

ANNEXTURES

A. SITREP 2026

B. Humanity 7.0 abridged

C. The Evidential Vault – 198 (193+5) voices with source links where available

D. The Seven-Domain Search

E. Decade of Secretarial Diagnostics (verified record)

F. Any leftover sources, disclaimers, acknowledgements

G. Closing and thank you note

Annex A is the dated SITREP record. Where figures or protocols differ from Chapters 1, 3, 6 and 8, those chapters govern this edition.

This settles the US\$19.97 trillion figure, the No-Man's Land Declaration and the “dignity” wording in Annex A without editing the archived reproduction.

ANNEXTURE-A: SITREP 2026

https://www.kxbbioverse.com/_files/ugd/3c4714_6e35e425cc29471989e9c6397a347f70.pdf

SITREP 2026: The Conflict Economy vs. Peaceland Protocol & the Universal Circulation Mandate

Permanent Hardware Fix for Gaza, IMEC, and All 59 Global Conflict Zones

Presented by: DT TRIO LABS @ GVLN Peaceland, Inc. (dba KXB BIOVERSE)

Framework: Governance + Finance + Trade + Infrastructure + Mobility - GCIGS Dual-Core (Standards + Global Council) + G-TRADE – GT2 – UCO + 7GIR-OS

Original-source verification note: Certain quantitative claims contained in the February 2026 presentation - including a total count of international governing bodies, an aggregate “Loophole Economy” cost, a derived daily institutional-friction figure, and the associated “Day One Dividend” recovery estimate - could not be independently verified during preparation of this edition. Those figures are therefore omitted from the reproduction below, while their existence in the original record is disclosed here. The original dated source remains available through the Research Repository.

Editorial status note: This reproduction retains the original SITREP's policy propositions, structure, and terminology wherever possible. Verified external figures have been sourced or corrected; unsupported quantitative claims are disclosed and omitted; historical terms marked as non-canonical do not supersede the current architecture presented elsewhere in this edition.

I. The Parade of Fragmentation - A Systems Failure

We are currently witnessing organized chaos on a scale unmatched since 1945. The world is facing diplomatic failure, and unresolved conflict zones are treated as political debates rather than structural faults. Global trade, energy, data, communication, and infrastructure corridors are being throttled by conflict zones left unresolved. The UN's 2026 regular budget has been cut to \$3.45 billion,¹ leaving its core missions in a state of strain - evidence that the current fragmentation carries real institutional cost.

II. The Kinetic Audit (The 59 Wars) There are currently 59 active state-based global conflicts² - including the Gaza deadlock, Ukraine bottlenecks, Red Sea chokepoints, the Strait of Hormuz, and high-friction zones along India's borders.

These are not simply political debates. They share four recurring traits:

1. Sovereignty without circulation
2. Security without dignity
3. Aid without ownership
4. Territory without infrastructure continuity

These zones absorb disproportionate political bandwidth relative to the populations directly involved.

III. Governance Architecture - GCIGS Dual-Core + DoNB

Editorial note: this section reflects GCIGS's earlier dual-core formulation, including a separate Council entity, as originally published. The current architecture consolidates this into a single GCIGS entity (the Global Coherent Integrated Governance Standard); this earlier structure does not supersede that current form.

- Global Coherent Integrated Governance Standard
- Global Council of Integrated Governance Standards

- Department of Nation Building (DoNB) - a proposed department within each nation to oversee critical domestic growth under GCIGS protocols

GCIGS operates as a dual-core system:

Standards Core: automated, non-negotiable universal protocols; HAM (Human-AI-Machine) convergence; HSM (Human Survival Metrics) verified enforcement [Original SITREP terminology; not designated as canonical elsewhere in this edition]; Prosperity Bonds auto-locking on kinetic breach [Original SITREP terminology; not designated as canonical elsewhere in this edition].

Global Governance Council: representatives from every nation's government, private, financial, technology, and transmedia sectors. Governance is architectural, applied uniformly, rather than the pursuit of any single agenda.

GCIGS operates as a collective global mandate - nations align by choice, since the architecture of trade, passage, and circulation is designed so that coherence becomes the rational default.

IV. The 2026 Financial Audit

Global military spending reached \$2.718 trillion in 2024,³ rising to \$2.887 trillion in 2025 - an increase of 2.9 percent.⁴ Separate industry projections place global defense spending at approximately \$2.6 trillion on a narrower measurement basis in 2026;⁵ this figure and SIPRI's global total use different methodologies and should not be read as describing the same measurement. Regional growth, particularly across Asia and the Pacific, is running above the global average in some datasets. On current trajectory, the UN Secretary-General projects spending could reach \$4.7 to \$6.6 trillion annually by 2035.⁶

The Gaza reconstruction cost is now estimated at \$70 to \$71.4 billion.⁷ India has maintained fiscal discipline, targeting a deficit of 4.3 percent of GDP in its 2026-27 Union Budget.⁸

A modeled Lloyd's scenario estimates that continued geopolitical fragmentation carries potential economic losses of up to \$14.5 trillion over a five-year horizon under adverse conditions⁹ - a projected risk under that scenario, not a currently realized cost.

V. De-Misting the Fog of the Current Global Situation

The world's economic impact of violence reached \$19.97 trillion in 2024 - 11.6 percent of global GDP, or \$2,455 per person.¹⁰ Geoeconomic confrontation is now ranked by the World Economic Forum as 2026's leading global risk, ahead of state-based armed conflict itself.¹¹

The humanitarian system faces its own strain: the UN's 2026 appeal reflects a shift toward hyper-prioritization, with approximately \$33 billion requested overall and \$23 billion prioritized for 87 million people in greatest need.¹²

The No-Man's Land Declaration - The Core Solution

Under this proposal, every one of the 59 active conflict zones would be formally declared a Global No-Man's Land. No single nation, bloc, or entity would hold sovereignty. All participating nations would hold equal standing and equal voice in its governance through GCIGS.

The zone is not developed, not claimed, not monetized. It is held in permanent neutral status - a breathing space for the earth and for humanity.

This is not a ceasefire. It is a structural reclassification. The conflict does not pause - it loses its legal and territorial basis entirely.

The principle operates on three pillars:

- Equal sovereignty - all nations hold equal standing, none holds advantage
- Structural vacancy - no development, no ownership, no future claim
- Permanent neutrality - governed by protocol, not by politics

When the land belongs to no one, war over it becomes structurally irrational.

VI. The No-Man's Landing Proposal & Prosperity Dividend

Converting the 59 declared zones, and any others subsequently identified, into neutral Breathing Spaces offers a direct alternative to continued fragmentation's cost.

Instead of the scale currently spent on armed conflict, comparable capital could:

- End global hunger for approximately \$93 billion annually¹³
- Fully vaccinate every child for approximately \$285 billion¹⁴
- Fund twelve years of quality education for every child in low-income nations for approximately \$5 trillion¹⁵

VII. De-Escalation Protocol

Objective: providing structural pathways for voluntary conflict reduction.

- Predictable pause windows: standardized time-blocks for cessation of movement, enabling humanitarian and diplomatic activity
- Standardized voluntary communication interfaces: non-operational protocols for information exchange, minimizing miscalculation
- Shared escalation-risk indicators: common GCIGS metrics allowing all parties to monitor rising tension
- Dignified retreat mechanisms: time-bound structural pathways for withdrawal without triggering further friction

Any territory identified as an active conflict zone - currently 59 as of February/Q2 2026, and any subsequently identified - is eligible for declaration under the No-Man's Land

Protocol. Strategic waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz, and shared growth corridors such as IMEC, are proposed as Global Neutral Passage Corridors - collectively maintained by all nations under universal GCIGS protocol, with equal access rights superseding any single nation's restrictive authority.

VIII. Universal Stabilization Protocol

Objective: restoring the foundational systems required for sustainable peace.

- Infrastructure continuity: structural maintenance and reconnection of essential utilities
- Resource coordination: non-partisan distribution of vital resources for civilian survival
- Civil administrative continuity: restoration of basic civic functions
- Economic reactivation sequencing: a deliberate order for restoring local and global markets and financial exchange, supporting genuine self-sufficiency

Conclusion: The Choice of Humanity 7.0

The world currently pays a real cost to maintain 59 active frontlines and a fragmented institutional response to them. By adopting the No-Man's Land Protocol, the proposition moves from a world preparing for conflict to a world circulating cross-border trade, energy, and dignity.

¹ United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Committee, 2026 Program Budget adoption, December 2025-January 2026 (\$3.45 billion, down from \$3.72 billion; ~19% staff reduction; ~\$1.586 billion in member-state arrears).

² Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), global conflict count, reported June 2024 (59 conflicts, 2023 data); UNDP trends update, February 2026. Later UCDP tracking places 2024-25 state-based conflicts at 61-65, depending on methodology and year; 59 is preserved here as SITREP's own original timestamp, not the current count.

³ SIPRI, global military expenditure data, 2024.

⁴ SIPRI, global military expenditure data, April 2026 release (2025 figures).

⁵ Forecast International, global defense spending projections, reported in National Defense Magazine, January 29, 2026 - uses a narrower methodology than SIPRI's global total above.

⁶ United Nations Secretary-General, The Security We Need.

⁷ World Bank, United Nations, and European Union, Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA), 2025-2026.

⁸ Union Budget 2026-27, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.

⁹ Lloyd's, modeled economic loss scenario, geopolitical fragmentation risk analysis.

¹⁰ Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2025.

¹¹ World Economic Forum, Global Risks Report 2026.

¹² United Nations humanitarian appeal reporting, 2026.

¹³ United Nations World Food Program, 2026 Global Outlook (\$93 billion, ending global hunger).

¹⁴ United Nations Secretary-General material on comparative development financing (\$285 billion, universal child vaccination).

¹⁵ United Nations Secretary-General material on comparative development financing (\$5 trillion, twelve years of education for every child in low-income nations).

Archived Original

The original February 2026 / Q2 2026 public SITREP remains available as part of the documentary record:
kxbbioverse.com/_files/ugd/3c4714_ca423d9468134eb994d75c286aeb5314.pdf

Name	Role
GCIGS + GCIGS	Dual core. Governance protocols and governance council. Council members drawn from each nation; dual role — hold the Council, and oversee domestic implementation through DoNB.
DoNB	Department of Nation Building. Executes the GCIGS protocols inside that state, under that state’s authority.
7GIR-OS	Operating system + operational integration + synchronization fabric.
G-Trade	Cross-border economic layer. Conversion, settlement, trade compliance.
BIOME	Human experiential layer.

ANNEXTURE-B:
Humanity 7.0 abridged
Humanity 7.0 = Interoperable Sovereignty =
वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्
One Earth Across Sovereign Border Lines
powered by 7GIR-OS + G-Trade + GCIGS +
BIOME
the global operational standards architecture

Annex C - The Evidential Vault

81st General Debate, complete record - 198 of 198

This is the complete evidential vault: full entries for every captured voice, in speaking order, followed by the thirteen names the search could not obtain. Every entry carries its speaker, date, sources, and source status. This closes the vault; nothing further is sought

.Captured voices (1–185) of total 198

L = logged with content · D = delivery confirmed, content thin · A = confirmed absent (a stated non-delivery, not a search gap).

1. United Nations (Secretary-General)

Speaker: António Guterres, Secretary-General Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: UNSDG (unsdg.un.org), globalsecurity.org reproduction, UN Tanzania office

Source status: Primary/near-primary, three-source match

“The fault lines in our world are widening. Cracks have become canyons... The climate crisis went from distant warning to daily reality. And artificial intelligence moved at a speed that has blindsided even those who created it.”

2. United Nations (General Assembly President)

Speaker: Khalilur Rahman, President of the 81st Session Date: 22 September 2026

Sources: UN transcript (primary, opening statement)

Source status: Primary

“Outside these walls, people are not asking whether the United Nations still exists. They are asking whether it works.” “Africa needs to be at the table, not on the menu.”

3. Brazil

Speaker: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Carried from earlier verification pass

Source status: Verified (prior pass)

“The credibility of the international order has been weakened due to the selective paralysis of our core institutions... We cannot accept a return to the law of the jungle.”

4. United States

Speaker: Donald J. Trump, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: whitehouse.gov official release; Roll Call/Factbase full transcript; UN Web TV

Source status: Primary (White House official release)

“We cut the UN budget for the first time ever, slashing it by 15% in 2026 and eliminating more than 4,000 positions from the UN bureaucracy.”

“There is no global government. And while I’m President, there will be no global taxes.”

Called on Iran to “fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz and return to the negotiating table.”

5. Jordan

Speaker: King Abdullah II, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: kingabdullah.jo (official); Jordan Times; Jordan News Agency (Petra)

Source status: Primary (kingabdullah.jo)

“For decades, I have stood before this Assembly and warned of the dangers of leaving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict unresolved... Until temporary became permanent, and permanent became policy.”

6. Turkey

Speaker: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: UN News; UN Türkiye office; Euronews; Al Jazeera

Source status: Near-primary, strongly corroborated

“The United Nations, established 81 years ago to maintain international peace and security, is no longer able to fulfil this mission. Or more precisely, it has been rendered unable to do so.”

Proposed abolishing the Security Council veto entirely: “The Security Council must absolutely be reformed in accordance with the principle that the world is bigger than five.”

7. Kyrgyzstan

Speaker: Sadyr Japarov, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: open.kg (sourced to the President’s press service); THE AsiaN (independent analysis)

Source status: Strong multi-outlet corroboration

Proposed a public registry of UN resolution implementation and a phased response mechanism for non-compliance.

Proposed the UN hold exclusive right to impose sanctions, with mandatory preliminary review of consequences.

8. Qatar

Speaker: Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Gulf Times (QNA official translation); The Peninsula Qatar; Qatar Tribune; The Times of Israel

Source status: Near-primary, strongly corroborated

“There can be no talk of a just international order so long as Palestine remains a blind spot within it.”

On Gaza: “What has transpired in Gaza is genocide in every sense of the word, and a stain of shame on the conscience.”

9. Lithuania

Speaker: Gitanas Nausėda, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: GlobalSecurity.org (Lithuanian Presidency official release)

Source status: Near-primary

Named Russia’s war against Ukraine the greatest threat to international order.

“Lithuania is investing in trustworthy artificial intelligence... advancing the implementation of the Vilnius Convention, the first legally binding international treaty on artificial intelligence.” (Convention verified: CETS No. 225, opened 5 Sept 2024, not yet in force.)

10. Peru

Speaker: Keiko Sofía Fujimori Higuchi, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: UNifeed; Latin Times; Breitbart

Source status: Primary (UNifeed)

On transnational crime, framed as war: “In this war there are no battle grounds, no fronts... There are no international rules governing these conflicts. The enemy does not wear a uniform.”

11. Chile

Speaker: José Antonio Kast, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Rio Times; inkl.com

Source status: Strong dual-outlet corroboration

“This organization has not lived up to the challenges of our times.” Proposed a Security Council overhaul.

12. Finland

Speaker: Alexander Stubb, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: presidentti.fi (official)

Source status: Primary

“No single state should have veto power. And, if a member of the Security Council violates the UN Charter, its voting rights should be suspended.”

Independently cited “65 active armed conflicts” — corroborating the report’s own UCDP figure.

13. Luxembourg

Speaker: Guillaume V, Grand Duke, Head of State Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Chronicle.lu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement); Mezha.net

Source status: Confirmed via official ministry statement

Called for Security Council reform, stronger African representation, and empowering the General Assembly when the Council is blocked.

14. France

Speaker: Emmanuel Macron, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Carried from earlier verification pass

Source status: Verified (prior pass)

“What is happening is a spectacle that should shame us all... Do we want to live under this state of affairs — with a return to the law of the jungle — or do we want to live in a civilized international society?”

15. Angola

Speaker: João Lourenço, President; African Union Chair, Feb 2025–Feb 2026 Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: TV47 Digital; Pulse Kenya

Source status: Strong dual-outlet, paraphrase not verbatim

Devoted the address to AI and digital transformation, calling for greater African participation in global AI governance.

16. Mongolia

Speaker: Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Anadolu Agency (via anews.com.tr, ua.news)

Source status: Consistent dual-outlet paraphrase

Called for greater international cooperation on climate change and environmental protection.

17. South Korea

Speaker: Lee Jae Myung, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: UPI; NK News; SBS (translation caveat noted)

Source status: Strong

Called for swift resumption of US–North Korea talks.

Proposed nations unite on supply-chain crises “including issues surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.”

18. Suriname

Speaker: Jennifer Geerlings-Simons, President — first female head of state Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Jamaica Gleaner; Caribbean Today; Caribbean Bridges

Source status: Strong, three-outlet corroboration

Endorsed a female Caribbean candidate for UN Secretary-General; “We are at that time in history where trust in the United Nations must urgently be restored.”

19. Sierra Leone

Speaker: Julius Maada Bio, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: statehouse.gov.sl (official); PM News Nigeria; Rio Times

Source status: Primary

Cited global military spending at “almost US\$2.9 trillion in 2025” — corroborating the report’s own SIPRI figure.

“The Security Council still reflects the world of 1945.” Specified: two permanent seats plus veto for Africa, five non-permanent seats.

20. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Speaker: Denis Bećirović, Chairman of the Presidency (Bosniak member) Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Balkan Insight; Sarajevo Times

Source status: Strong; internal dispute over representation independently confirmed

“There must not be one standard for large and another for small states.” Note: fellow Presidency member Željka Cvijanović publicly disputed his standing to speak for the whole state.

21. Dominica

Speaker: Sylvanie Burton, President — first female and first Indigenous president Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: AP (Yahoo, US News, WRAL); WIC News; Nature Isle News/CMC

Source status: Strong, AP plus independent corroboration

“The true test of this organization... is how well we can work together to prevent that suffering in the first place.”

22. Switzerland

Speaker: Guy Parmelin, President of the Swiss Confederation Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: admin.ch (official); swissinfo.ch; Bluewin

Source status: Primary

“The most fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter... are being openly violated.” Foreign Minister Cassis raised the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab directly

23. Seychelles

Speaker: Patrick Herminie, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: statehouse.gov.sc (official); Rio Times; ATC News

Source status: Primary

“We are a friend to all, and an enemy to none.” “Small and vulnerable states should never bear the collateral economic costs of conflicts in which they have no part.”

24. Nauru

Speaker: David Adeang, President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Associated Press, syndicated across seven outlets

Source status: Primary-grade (AP)

Announced the country’s renaming from Nauru to Naoero: “There are moments in the life of a nation when its people are called to remember who they have always been.”

25. Vietnam

Speaker: Tô Lâm, General Secretary and President Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: baonghean.vn (state media full text); VietnamPlus/VNA; VOV5; open4business.com.ua

Source status: Near-primary, strongly corroborated

“Change is inevitable, as it is the objective movement of history. But conflict and confrontation are not inevitable.”

26. Tanzania

Speaker: Samia Suluhu Hassan, President (delivered by VP Deogratius Ndejemi) Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Monitor (Uganda); Citizen Digital (Kenya)

Source status: Strong dual-outlet

Called for Africa to achieve “three zeros”: zero preventable maternal and child deaths, zero home deliveries, zero unvaccinated children.

27. Bhutan

Speaker: Tshering Tobgay, Prime Minister Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: South Asian Herald; QNC News; ETV Bharat

Source status: Strong corroboration

Promoted the Gelephu Mindfulness City: “I stand before you today not as Prime Minister, but as a salesman.”

28. Trinidad and Tobago

Speaker: Kamla Persad-Bissessar, Prime Minister Category: Leaders’ Voices Date: 22 September 2026

Sources: NY Caribbean News, TTT News, AP photo record

Source status: Corroborated

Named illicit firearms and narcotics as a leading regional security threat; called for Haitian-led solutions and for cooperation to be measured by results; outlined priorities for the 2027–2028 Council term. Domestic praise and criticism kept separate.

29. Japan

Speaker: Sanae Takaichi, Prime Minister Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: mofa.go.jp, kantei.go.jp (both official); Japan Times; Sunday Guardian

Source status: Primary, two government sites

Called for removing the Charter’s 1940s “enemy state” reference to Japan; noted Russia has vetoed resolutions on its own conduct.

30. United Kingdom

Speaker: Andy Burnham, Prime Minister Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: gov.uk (official); UNA-UK; DPRTE

Source status: Primary

“Britain is back... a nation that wants to trade with the world and work together to solve the shared problems we face.” Reiterated the UK’s trade ban on Israeli settlement goods.

31. Croatia

Speaker: Andrej Plenković, Prime Minister Date: 22 September 2026

Sources: vlada.gov.hr (primary), Croatia Week, AA/Yeni Şafak

Source status: Primary

Advocated “modern sovereignism.” Condemned Serbia’s honoring of Ratko Mladić and rejected President Vučić’s remarks as “an unfounded defamatory campaign.”

32. Belgium

Speaker: Maxime Prévot, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Date: 22 September 2026

Sources: Jerusalem Post, Yeni Şafak/AA, Brussels Times

Source status: Strong

“The great powers must not be both the offenders and the enforcers at the same time.” Directly criticized Trump’s own address afterward as focused on “domestic US politics” and “diametrically opposed to ours.” Defended ICC/ICJ independence.

33. Morocco

Speaker: Nasser Bourita, Minister of Foreign Affairs (opened by invoking King Mohammed VI’s assessment) Date: Tuesday, 22 September 2026

Sources: Morocco World News; GlobalSecurity.org (Moroccan MFA); Atalayar

Source status: Strong, three-outlet corroboration

Announced Morocco’s candidacy for a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for 2028–2029.

34. Syria

Speaker: Ahmed al-Sharaa, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: UN News; UNifeed; Al Jazeera; Times of Israel; Enab Baladi

Source status: Near-primary, excellent corroboration

“Last year, I said that Syria had returned. Today, I say that Syria is rising.” Affirmed the Golan Heights “will remain Syrian land.”

35. Latvia

Speaker: Edgars Rinkēvičs, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026 (confirmed date; text pending)

Sources: UN Web TV, AP, UPI confirm attendance; mfa.gov.lv (context only — emergency Council meeting on Ukraine, same day)

Source status: PENDING — two search passes; floor-speech content not located

Not yet verified. No content included.

36. Romania

Speaker: Nicușor Dan, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: presidency.ro (official); Romania Insider; Romania Journal

Source status: Primary

Warned that coordinated fake accounts deny “one person, one voice, one vote.” Accused Russia of an “illegal” war and “a revisionist agenda.”

37. Burundi

Speaker: Évariste Ndayishimiye, President, 2026 African Union Chairperson Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Opposed a Human Rights Council special rapporteur imposed “without any prior dialogue.” Called for “a fair partnership so that our countries receive a fair return on the investments made in the education of our youth” (on African youth brain drain).

38. Iran

Speaker: Masoud Pezeshkian, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: UN News; CNN; NPR; PBS; Washington Post; Al Jazeera; CNBC

Source status: Near-primary, exceptional corroboration

Addressed the Assembly the day after Trump threatened to “annihilate” Iran: “The US president called us terrorists but we are the victims of terrorists.” “We seek energy for progress.”

39. Paraguay

Speaker: Santiago Peña, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: Reuters (via US News, Yahoo); South China Morning Post; Breitbart

Source status: Strong, Reuters-sourced

Cast a Taiwan Strait conflict as potentially graver than the Hormuz closure: microchips are “to this century what oil was to the last.”

40. Czech Republic

Speaker: Petr Pavel, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: Expats.cz (two pieces); Around Prague (two pieces); UPI

Source status: Strong corroboration

Argued rules “only mean something if everyone abides by them” — aimed at Russia and China. Called for binding international AI rules.

41. Argentina

Speaker: Javier Milei, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: UN News; Al Jazeera; UPI; Buenos Aires Times; Breitbart

Source status: Near-primary plus strong multi-outlet corroboration

Called the UN “a useless organization whose only purpose is to sustain a caste of fatally arrogant parasites masquerading as well-intentioned bureaucrats.”

“It is time to recognize that this sacred covenant has been broken.”

42. Estonia

Speaker: Alar Karis, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: ERR (Estonian public broadcaster, near-primary); AP

Source status: Near-primary

“Estonia believes that after 81 years, it is time for a woman to lead the UN.”

43. Timor-Leste

Speaker: José Ramos-Horta, President, Nobel Peace Laureate Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: TATOLI (Timor-Leste state news agency, primary); UN Web TV

Source status: Primary

On developing countries and AI: “must actively participate in their governance and development — not merely receive technologies designed elsewhere.”

44. Libya

Speaker: Mohamed al-Menfi, Chairman of the Presidential Council Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: Arab News (two versions); Middle East Eye

Source status: Strong corroboration

Announced Libya will seek Africa’s UN Security Council seat for 2028. Called for an order “in which the rule of law is an equal right, not a privilege of the most powerful.”

45. Palau

Speaker: Surangel Whipps Jr., President; Pacific Islands Forum Chair Date: Thursday, 24 September 2026

Sources: Islands Business/PACNEWS; PINA; National Indigenous Times; AP

Source status: Strong corroboration

“The Pacific is our home, not a theatre for geopolitical competition.” Called for accessible climate finance for SIDS.

46. Cyprus

Speaker: Nikos Christodoulides, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: GlobalSecurity.org (gov.cy text); Greek City Times (two pieces); Neos Kosmos; Cyprus Mail; AP

Source status: Primary text plus strong corroboration

“UN resolutions cannot be upheld in one case and fully disregarded in another.” Directly confronted Erdoğan’s prior-day speech as “maximum hypocrisy.”

47. Dominican Republic

Speaker: Luis Abinader, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: Reuters (Yahoo, US News); Dominican Today

Source status: Strong, Reuters-sourced

Urged more troops and stronger backing for the Haiti mission; the Security Council “had already approved the framework... but not the means to make it effective.”

48. Botswana

Speaker: Duma Boko, President Date: Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Sources: Rio Times; UN Web TV

Source status: Verified

“Debt sustainability is a question of development and fairness” — developing countries face borrowing costs several times higher than wealthier nations.

49. Ecuador

Speaker: Daniel Noboa, President Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: UN Web TV, wire syndication

Source status: Confirmed, strong

Called it “inadmissible” that “criminal organizations cooperate more effectively with each other than States.” Proposed an international mechanism to track and freeze illicit financial flows.

50. Ukraine

Speaker: Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: president.gov.ua (primary), PBS/AP, Al Jazeera

Source status: Primary

“We want Russia — which started this war and is stealing land — to be held responsible.” “When someone gives Russia more money through trade, they give this war more time.”

51. Bulgaria

Speaker: Iliana Iotova, President Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: BTA (near-primary), UN Web TV, AP

Source status: Near-primary

Spoke against “double standards for small and large States.” Called for the Black Sea to become “a zone of free transport, energy, trade and digital corridors.”

52. Central African Republic

Speaker: President Faustin-Archange Touadéra Category: Leaders’ Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: AP photo record (Chronicle Online, Journal-News), Anadolu via Türkiye Today

Source status: Delivery confirmed with themes

Drew attention to security challenges and development needs facing CAR, calling on the international community to increase support for African peace and development efforts — consistent with his recurring themes in prior years (Security Council reform, financial architecture reform, structural peacekeeping financing).

53. Panama

Speaker: José Raúl Mulino, President Category: Leaders’ Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: UN News (Spanish), Telemetro (two), UN Web TV

Source status: Near-primary

Said many people feel international bodies have forgotten the values of most citizens; asked for a permanent Security Council position for Latin America and the Caribbean; claims Darién migration fell 99% in 2025; will lead an effort on the rights of nature.

54. Ethiopia

Speaker: Taye Atske-Selassie Amde, President (the roster listed Abiy Ahmed) Category: Leaders’ Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: allAfrica (two), The Reporter Ethiopia, Fana, Addis Media Network, AP

Source status: Strong

Asked how a world with a conscience can deny 1.6 billion Africans equal representation (wording varies across sources); called for comprehensive Security Council reform, reliable access to the sea, and announced Ethiopia will host COP32 in November 2027.

55. Poland

Speaker: Karol Nawrocki, President Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: Ukrinform via Censor.NET, UN Web TV

Source status: Strong

Called for the international community to respond “decisively, consistently, and collectively” to Russia’s actions.

56. Namibia

Speaker: Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, President Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: UN Web TV, AP photo record, Mt Kenya Times (analysis)

Source status: Delivery confirmed; one floor point

Asked members to elect a woman as Secretary-General after 81 years of male leadership. Pre-speech briefings expected investment, energy, critical minerals and value addition. Full text still to pull.

57. Slovakia

Speaker: Peter Pellegrini, President Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: Radio Slovakia International (three)

Source status: Strong

Warned against force replacing rules; favours “evolution rather than revolution” in UN reform with more voice for underrepresented regions. On AI: “We should never give machines the ability to make independent decisions about life and death.” Bidding for a Council seat for 2028–2029.

58. Kenya

Speaker: William Ruto, President Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: UN News (primary)

Source status: Primary

“The equality proclaimed in this assembly ends at the doors of the Security Council.” “Capital must price risk. It must not price prejudice.” Cited debt reaching \$102 trillion in 2024; 46 developing countries spend more on debt interest than health/education.

59. Serbia

Speaker: Aleksandar Vučić, President Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: Kosovo Online, Vreme, Srpske Novine

Source status: Strong

“The international order based on respect for the UN Charter... no longer existed.” Vowed to “defend its territorial integrity and the UN Charter,” referencing Kosovo.

60. Mozambique

Speaker: Daniel Chapo, President Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: mznews.co.mz (two), O Económico, Africas Play, AIM (Portuguese, translations mine)

Source status: Strong

Said trust depends on fair application of international law and decisions with concrete results; asked for cooperation against terrorism and help in Cabo Delgado; argued for processing and value retention instead of raw-material export, and financial-architecture reform.

61. Guinea

Speaker: Mamadi Doumbouya, President (took power in a 2021 coup; won the 2025 election) Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: Full text via Guée114, Guinée360, Courrier Régional; UN AV Library

Source status: Strong

Repeated his earlier view that governance models imported without adaptation struggle to deliver, this time to share facts. Claims a referendum constitution and an electoral cycle funded entirely by the treasury without significant incidents (his claims), and a “Simandou 2040” programme.

62. Eswatini

Speaker: King Mswati III Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: Eswatini Positive News (King's Office), Times of Eswatini, AP

Source status: Secondary-grade

Called for a shift “from the exportation of unprocessed raw materials to value addition”; linked war to reversed development; raised the Ezulwini Consensus, respect for small countries, and Taiwan's participation. Provisional pending the UN text.

63. Honduras

Speaker: Nasry Asfura, President (in office since 27 January 2026) Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: UN News (Spanish), Infobae, UN Web TV, AP

Source status: Near-primary

Said no country can face transnational crime or extreme climate alone; asked for new solutions on water, agriculture and early warning; presented Honduras as open to investment. Claims IMF commitments met, reserves up \$1.3 billion, and progress on returning to ICSID (his claims).

64. Montenegro

Speaker: Jakov Milatović, President Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: Streamlinefeed, Kurir (hostile framing, quotes only), Montenegrin outlets, Fox 5 schedule

Source status: Corroborated; provisional

Marked 20 years of UN membership; said trust cannot be rebuilt through empty declarations; wants reconciliation based on international court judgments and not on glorifying convicted war criminals; targets EU accession by 2028.

65. Venezuela

Speaker: Delcy Rodríguez, Acting President (in office since 5 January 2026; legal status disputed) Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: UN News, AP via NBC News, Al Jazeera

Source status: Near-primary

Described two tests in 2026, a political crisis linked to the US and the 24 June earthquakes; said rebirth means rebuilding trust in institutions, not only buildings. “Elections will be held in Venezuela,” with no date. Welcomed resumed relations with Washington. Critics say the US sidelined the opposition for oil and investment deals.

66. Uganda

Speaker: Jessica Alupo, Vice President, for President Museveni Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 23 or 24 September 2026 (sources conflict)

Sources: UN Web TV, New Vision, Business Times Uganda, Pulse Uganda

Source status: Strong; date to settle

Asked for global financial reform with a stronger developing-country voice at the IMF and World Bank, and Security Council reform. Museveni's statement endorsed Olara Otunnu for Secretary-General.

67. Rwanda

Speaker: Justin Nsengiyumva, Prime Minister Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: KT Press (two), The New Times, UN Web TV

Source status: Strong

Said the UN is better at responding to crises than anticipating them and should be judged on results. Cites the FDLR threat and says the roots of the eastern DRC conflict are political and need a political solution (Rwanda's position). At an AI side event: "inclusion without capacity is ceremonial."

68. Spain

Speaker: Pedro Sánchez, President of the Government Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: La Moncloa (primary)

Source status: Primary

"No country should be both judge and party, however powerful it may be." Proposed abolishing the Security Council veto; proposed a Latin American woman as next Secretary-General.

69. Andorra

Speaker: Xavier Espot Zamora, Head of Government (final UNGA appearance in this role) Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: Alto, Demócrata, AP (multi-syndicated)

Source status: Strong

Framed global challenges as "a profound crisis of trust." Called for "a just, global, and lasting peace" for Ukraine and a negotiated two-state solution.

70. Democratic Republic of the Congo

Speaker: Judith Suminwa, Prime Minister, for President Tshisekedi Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: UN News, allAfrica, JURIST, XtrAfrica

Source status: Strong

Said peace remains only a promise for millions and that "we don't need new texts" but implementation of Resolution 2773 and the Washington and Doha processes. "We cannot build a decarbonized economy through blood-stained minerals." Alleges a war led by Rwanda through the AFC/M23 (the DRC's position; Rwanda disputes it).

71. Italy

Speaker: Antonio Tajani, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (Prime Minister Meloni did not attend) Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 23 September 2026 (evening)

Sources: esteri.it (published text), ANSA, AP

Source status: Primary

Said the UN “must regain the ability to decide and, above all, to act” and that the Council “must not be an exclusive club”; cited 61 armed conflicts. Note: an altered video attributing an anti-Israel UN speech to Meloni is circulating; it is fake.

72. Uzbekistan

Speaker: Saida Mirziyoyeva, Head of the Presidential Administration Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 23 September 2026

Sources: Gazeta.uz (full text, translation), Euronews, Zamin.uz, UN video record

Source status: Strong

Said there “cannot be universal justice without universal law”; wants a UN that implements decisions “in real life”; backed an expanded Council; announced a Council candidacy for 2035–2036 and NAM chairing from 2027.

73. Zimbabwe

Speaker: Emmerson Mnangagwa, President Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Security Council stuck in “outdated geopolitical realities of 1945.” Developing countries face a financing gap exceeding \$4 trillion.

74. Madagascar

Speaker: Michael Randrianirina, President Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Financing criteria relying “solely on GDP per capita, excluding many vulnerable countries.” Proposed a multidimensional vulnerability index.

75. Ghana

Speaker: John Dramani Mahama, President Date: Thursday, 24 September 2026

Sources: 3News, Graphic Online, MyJoyOnline, Adomonline

Source status: Near-primary (multi-outlet identical release)

“The structural legacies of those historic crimes continue to fuel systemic racism, economic marginalization, and a global financial architecture weighted against Africa and people of African descent.”

76. Palestine

Speaker: Mahmoud Abbas, President (pre-recorded, denied US visa second consecutive year) Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN News (primary), France 24, The National, JTA

Source status: Primary, exceptional corroboration

“The danger... has now come to threaten the very life and existence of the Palestinian people on their homeland.” “The Palestinian people will remain on their land... will not disappear.”

77. Guyana

Speaker: Irfaan Ali, President Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Endorsed Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett for Secretary-General — cross-validating Suriname’s endorsement of the same candidate. Called for Security Council seats for Africa and Latin America/Caribbean.

78. Somalia

Speaker: Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Hormuz disruption caused an estimated 40% decline in Somalia’s customs revenue — a concrete, quantified illustration of cross-border impact on a country with no stake in the conflict.

79. Comoros

Speaker: Azali Assoumani, President Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Called for financing criteria to reflect “multidimensional vulnerability,” not just GDP per capita. Raised the territorial dispute with France over Mayotte.

80. Liberia

Speaker: Joseph Boakai, President Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Security Council “home to 1.5 billion people... yet 80% of Security Council mandates concern Africa peace and security, while Africa remains without a single permanent seat.” World Bank/IMF governance “still reflects the world of 1945.”

81. Bolivia

Speaker: Rodrigo Paz Pereira, President Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UPI, AP, Infobae, La Razón, UN Web TV

Source status: Strong

"Multilateralism has to act much more quickly"; said organised-crime money outruns governments; described blockades of about 50 days he says were financed by narco-trafficking. Cites reserves of about \$1.2 billion (sources disagree on the starting figure, so only the current figure is used).

82. Hungary

Speaker: András Baka, President (in office since 19 August 2026) Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: CNN, Ukrainska Pravda, Budapest Times, AP

Source status: Strong

Said the UN is in a crisis of trust and often stays inactive when major powers and allies break rules: "We need it, and we need it to work." Condemned Russia's war and affirmed Ukraine's sovereignty; warned a new majority must not become the "new owner of the state."

83. Uruguay

Speaker: Yamándú Orsi, President Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN News (Spanish), MercoPress, Presidencia (translations mine)

Source status: Near-primary

Wants institutions "more effective, more representative and closer to people's needs"; objected that the world is hostage to "a handful of countries" on the Security Council; condemned the Cuba blockade; said the fire "needs no more fuel." MercoPress contrasts his tone with Milei's. Date check: MercoPress places Milei on Tuesday, our record says 23 September.

84. European Union

Speaker: António Costa, President of the European Council Category: Observer Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: CNN (single source)

Source status: Provisional; full text to pull

Said there can be no double standards in terms of international law and that defending it is a responsibility, not an option; called for protecting the institutions of the legal order.

85. Equatorial Guinea

Speaker: Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, Vice President, for the President Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN Journal (delivery), AP photo record, Rio Times

Source status: Delivery confirmed; content provisional

An 18-minute speech asking for a fuller African role in global decisions and pitching over \$2.5 billion of infrastructure. Reported link to a May 2025 ICJ ruling on three islands and a July 2026 AU-brokered implementation deal; details unverified.

86. Gambia

Speaker: Muhammed Jallow, Vice President Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN Meetings Coverage (snippet), AP photo record

Source status: Primary-grade

Said Gambia's chairing of the Second Committee shows multilateralism can still deliver: it "does not require unanimity on every issue," only willingness to stay at the table and compromise.

87. Colombia

Speaker: José Manuel Restrepo, Vice President, reading President De la Espriella's text Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN Web TV, ColombiaOne, The City Paper Bogotá, Fox News

Source status: Strong

First time a Colombian VP has addressed the Assembly as the country's highest representative. The president's text criticised UN bureaucracy and effectiveness, questioned whether human rights are applied by different political criteria, and called for efficiency and agreement on terrorism, investment, security, and a democratic transition in Venezuela.

88. Israel

Speaker: Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: PM's office release (primary, via JNS)

Source status: Primary

Built his address around unilateral military action rather than institutional reform: "if we hadn't done it, we'd all be dead." "If there are any other moral cowards who haven't yet left this hall—please do so now."

89. Portugal

Speaker: Luís Montenegro, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: Anadolu/aneuws.com.tr, The Portugal News

Source status: Strong

Called for permanent Security Council seats for "Africa for Africa, Brazil, and India."

90. Senegal

Speaker: Bassirou Diomaye Faye, President Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN.org summary (French), AP photo record; APS via syndication (secondary, endorsement only)

Source status: Near-primary; endorsement secondary

Called for a UN that is "stronger, more representative and more effective"; covered the Sahel, reform of the financial architecture and the Security Council, and UN80.

Reported to have endorsed Macky Sall for Secretary-General.

91. Fiji

Speaker: Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, President Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: AP, Fiji Sun (two)

Source status: Strong

Asked why the world “has still not acted” on Pacific warnings; called climate a “global group project shared by all 8 billion people”; asked for law protecting statehood and maritime zones from sea-level rise; brought an Ocean of Peace Declaration.

92. Ivory Coast

Speaker: Tiémoko Meyliet Koné, Vice President, for President Ouattara Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: AIP (French, translation mine), Gazette NG, AP

Source status: Strong

Warned of “the gradual fragmentation of its peace architecture,” citing the DRC, Sudan and the Sahel; asked for a permanent African Council seat and reform of the financial system; “we must choose dialogue over confrontation.”

93. Nigeria

Speaker: Bola Tinubu, President (delivered by VP Kashim Shettima) Date: Thursday, 24 September 2026

Sources: Channels TV; Vanguard; PM News (multiple); Muslim News Nigeria; official full text

Source status: Primary text, strong corroboration

Demanded, per the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, two permanent African Council seats with veto, plus five non-permanent seats.

94. Yemen

Speaker: Abdullah Al-Alimi Bawazir, Vice President of the Presidential Leadership Council Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN News, Asharq Al-Awsat, Yemen Monitor

Source status: Near-primary

Asked the world to move from “crisis management” to strategic partnership and stop arms and technology reaching the Houthis; said restoring the state and securing Bab al-Mandab are “one issue.” The government’s account; the Houthis are not represented.

95. Kuwait

Speaker: Sheikh Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Hamad Al-Sabah, Crown Prince, for the Amir Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: Kuwait Times (three reports), Arab Times, AFP

Source status: Strong

Said Kuwait, the GCC states and Jordan have been under Iranian attack since February; asked for freedom of navigation through Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. Welcomed Iraq’s steps to bring weapons under state control and asked it to finish maritime demarcation beyond marker 162 and cooperate on Resolution 2792 (prisoners, missing persons, property).

96. Barbados

Speaker: Mia Mottley, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN News (near-primary), Barbados Today, WIC News

Source status: Near-primary

“The failure to address these challenges... is a repeated failure to convert what we know into what we do” — naming a “crisis of responsibility.” Proposed systematic UN mediation teams to intervene before conflicts entrench; joined 123 other states backing veto restraint on mass atrocities.

97. Armenia

Speaker: Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: primeminister.am (primary), ARMENPRESS

Source status: Primary

Peace with Azerbaijan (est. 8 August 2025) has produced no cross-border-fire casualties in two and a half years — “the greatest value” created. Several thousand missing persons’ fates still unresolved.

98. Thailand

Speaker: Anutin Charnvirakul, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: Khaosod English, Thailand NOW

Source status: Strong

Trust “cannot be imposed, but can be built through smaller groups that gradually expand into broader cooperation.” Preferred bilateral negotiation over UN involvement on the Cambodia border dispute.

99. Georgia

Speaker: Irakli Kobakhidze, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: Georgia Today, JAMnews, aNewz

Source status: Strong

“Twenty percent of our country remains under the occupation of the Russian Federation.” Positioned Georgia as a Middle Corridor connectivity hub.

100. Bangladesh

Speaker: Tarique Rahman, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: The Daily Star, Daily Sun (near-primary), Asia Times

Source status: Near-primary

Third member of his family to address the General Assembly as head of government (father 1980, mother 1993) — unique in UN history. Called for the safe return of 1.2 million Rohingya refugees to Myanmar.

101. Netherlands

Speaker: Rob Jetten, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: government.nl (primary), NL Times, DutchNews

Source status: Primary

“Hands off the ICC, and all those other institutions that protect the international legal order” — a direct, sourced counter to Trump’s ICC rejection. Offered to host the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.

102. Slovenia

Speaker: Janez Janša, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: gov.si (primary), Fox News

Source status: Primary

Argued the UN over-attends Gaza relative to Ukraine, Belarus and Nigeria: “trust in the UN cannot be restored if the international community applies the same principles differently.”

103. Greece

Speaker: Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister Category: Leaders’ Voices Date: 24 September 2026 (not the 25th as first logged)

Sources: primeminister.gr (primary), Greek City Times, Capital.gr, ProtoThema

Said the rules and understandings that provided stability between states are increasingly tested; called Turkey’s “casus belli” a source of tension and asked that UNCLOS apply to the Aegean; on AI, said self-regulation by companies is not enough and international rules are needed.

104. Australia

Speaker: Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: UN News (near-primary), ABC News

Source status: Near-primary

“The UN mission cannot be entrusted solely to the great powers or the biggest countries, or even the loudest voices alone.” Cited Australia’s under-16 social media ban as a real governance model now followed by 20+ countries — a direct climate/AI counterpoint to Trump’s entry two days earlier.

105. Ireland

Speaker: Micheál Martin, Taoiseach Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: gov.ie (primary), RTÉ, Irish Times

Source status: Primary

“When the full truth of what has happened... in Gaza is finally known... it will shame the world.” Called on Iran to stop strikes in the Strait of Hormuz.

106. Nepal

Speaker: Balendra (Balen) Shah, Prime Minister Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: Kathmandu Post (near-primary, full transcript), Sahitya Post, Khabarhub

Source status: Near-primary

“Climate change does not recognize borders. Glaciers and floods do not travel with a visa stamped on passports.” Recalled Guterres’s own unheeded 2023 Everest warning, after floods killed 1,300+ and crossed into China and India.

107. Austria

Speaker: Beate Meinl-Reisinger, Federal Minister for European and International Affairs Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: AP (multi-syndicated)

Source status: Strong

Referenced the “Terminator” films and Schwarzenegger’s “killer robot” to warn that autonomous weapons, once science fiction, “are now real.”

108. South Africa

Speaker: Ronald Lamola, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Head of Delegation (President Ramaphosa gave a separate pre-recorded statement) Date: 24 September 2026

Sources: dirco.gov.za (primary), SABC News, Briefly.co.za

Source status: Primary

Co-sponsored with Brazil, Norway and Spain a UN resolution for an International Panel on Inequality (IPI), modelled on the IPCC. Cited that the richest 10% control 75% of global wealth. “The answer to the current crisis of multilateralism is not less multilateralism, but better and more inclusive multilateralism.”

109. Kiribati

Speaker: Taneti Maamau, President and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

“Trust cannot be restored by words alone.” Called for greater climate finance and SDG14 ocean conservation.

110. Maldives

Speaker: Hussain Mohamed Latheef, Vice President Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Condemned the closure of the Strait of Hormuz directly. Called for the Security Council veto to be abolished outright and for the next Secretary-General to be a woman:

“International law cannot bind the weak and bend for the powerful.”

111. Iraq

Speaker: Ali Falih Al-Zaidi, Prime Minister Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN News (near-primary), AP, The National, Iraqi News

Source status: Near-primary

Proposed energy links with Turkey, Jordan and Syria “to help address the Strait of Hormuz bottleneck.” “Invest with Iraq. Iraq has resources, markets, a good location.”

112. Lebanon

Speaker: Nawaf Salam, President of the Council of Ministers Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

“The problem is not the absence of rules. It is their selective application.” Called for veto restraint in cases of genocide and war crimes — notably moderate compared to full-abolition voices.

113. Monaco

Speaker: Christophe Mirmand, Minister of State Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

“Never since 1945 has the very legitimacy of states and multilateral bodies... been called into question to such an extent.”

114. Marshall Islands

Speaker: Hilda Heine, President Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Demanded a formal UN apology for 67 nuclear weapons tests conducted during its UN trusteeship (1946–1958) — unique content in this vault. Backed a seabed-mining moratorium (45 nations).

115. Malta

Speaker: Robert Abela, Prime Minister Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Cited Malta’s own 1967 UNCLOS-founding speech as precedent that small states can shift the world order.

116. Lesotho

Speaker: Sam Matekane, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and National Security Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

First country to pilot the UN Blueprint for National AI and Data Strategies — concrete implementation, not just a governance call.

117. Tuvalu

Speaker: Feleti Teo, Prime Minister Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript (partial)

Source status: Near-primary

The UN adopted a political declaration on sea level rise less than 24 hours before his speech, affirming statehood continuity despite rising seas.

118. North Macedonia

Speaker: Hristijan Mickoski, Prime Minister Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: BTA (Bulgaria), Republika English (North Macedonia), AP photo record

Source status: Strong

Said trust “cannot remain a one-sided obligation indefinitely”; wants EU accession merit-based and predictable, not derailed by bilateral issues; described a single NATO, US and EU orientation. BTA notes the constitutional amendment on Bulgarians is still pending.

119. Solomon Islands

Speaker: Matthew Wale, Prime Minister (elected 15 May 2026) Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN News Takeaway, Asia Pacific Report, AP

Source status: Near-primary

Called the ocean “our identity, our heritage and our future”; said the world spent over \$2.9 trillion on militaries, 16 times aid, and more on arms in under 18 days than developed countries give in a year in climate finance.

120. Saint Lucia

Speaker: Philip J. Pierre, Prime Minister Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: Caribbean Media Corporation wire (two republications)

Source status: Single wire source

Said small island states bear the consequences of decisions by more powerful countries and rules are too often applied selectively; asked for climate finance matching the crisis, Security Council reform and support for Haiti, “cooperation over coercion.”

121. Albania

Speaker: Edi Rama, Prime Minister Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: Argumentum, inAlbania, Euronews Albania, AP roundup

Source status: Secondary-grade

Said AI's danger is that it will "obey the wrong human beings perfectly"; called for an international compact on sovereign and democratic AI (transparency on AI political content, campaign financing disclosure, public-sector accountability). Cited protests as a case of fabricated narrative (contested at home).

122. Pakistan

Speaker: Shehbaz Sharif, Prime Minister Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: Express Tribune, Geo TV, Dawn News, Radio Pakistan

Source status: Strong

Warned any Indian move to "stop, impede or divert Pakistan's share of river waters would be treated as an act of war." Named Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab as arteries "that must carry the promise of prosperity, not the perils of war."

123. Papua New Guinea

Speaker: James Marape, Prime Minister Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: PM's department releases (own account), Asia Pacific Report, AP

Source status: Primary (own account)

"For Papua New Guinea, and for the small island nations of the Pacific, multilateralism matters"; thanked Guterres; asked members to defend religious freedom. At the sea-level plenary (separate): "It is enough of talking."

124. Niger

Speaker: Ali Lamine Zeine, Prime Minister of the transitional government Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: PassBlue, teleSUR English, Wake Up Singapore

Source status: Strong on themes; quotes provisional

"Our states' sovereignty is not negotiable. Our resources belong to our peoples." Said Niger's uranium "lit the cities of Europe while ours remained in darkness." Alleged, as his own claim, that France with Ukraine's complicity destabilises the Sahel; no response recorded.

125. Bahamas

Speaker: Philip Davis, Prime Minister Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: The Tribune, UN News Takeaway, AP

Source status: Strong

Said an order where rules apply only to the weak "is a hierarchy"; asked for an end to the Cuba embargo and more help for Haiti; endorsed the Declaration on Sea-Level Rise; asked former colonisers for reparatory justice: "truth, apology, restoration and development."

126. Haiti

Speaker: Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, Prime Minister (sole national leader since February 2026) Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN News, Tribune News Service, HaitiLibre, AP

Source status: Near-primary

Called Haiti's moment a "watershed"; the support force is still below 5,500: "A mandate is not enough." Asked to move "from aid to investment" and for free elections; appealed for migrants' dignity. Echoes the Dominican Republic's point about mandate without means.

127. Guinea-Bissau

Speaker: Ilídio Vieira Té, Prime Minister (appointed after the November 2025 coup) Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN News Takeaway, Rio Times, AU readout

Source status: Near-primary

Called for stronger multilateralism: no country can face today's challenges alone. Said the 6 December elections will be free (his statement) and confirmed a Council bid for 2028–2029.

128. Egypt

Speaker: Mostafa Madbouly, Prime Minister, heading the delegation on instructions of President el-Sisi Date: 22–23 September 2026

Sources: Egyptian Streets; Daily News Egypt (3 pieces, one via Reuters); Amwal Al Ghad; Egypt Today

Source status: Strong multi-outlet, including Reuters; format caveat noted

Called for redirecting the international financial system "to deliver greater fairness and better reflect the interests and needs of countries of the Global South."

Via Reuters: demanded UN Security Council reform to expand African representation.

129. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Speaker: Godwin Friday, Prime Minister (in office since November 2025) Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN News Takeaway, Jamaica Observer (CMC), iWitness News

Source status: Strong

Small states "cannot continue borrowing merely to replace what climate-related disasters repeatedly destroy"; asked for Security Council and climate-finance reform, an end to the Cuba embargo, reparatory justice and Taiwan's participation; urged the UN be fixed, not abandoned.

130. Tonga

Speaker: Lord Fakafānua, Prime Minister Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: PACNEWS/PINA, Kaniva Tonga, AP

Source status: Strong

Asked why the world "has still not acted"; said the Pacific loses about \$500 million a year to cyclones and floods; the Pacific must not become a staging ground for major-power rivalry; nominated Ivonne Baki for Secretary-General. Tonga says its delegate stayed seated during Netanyahu's speech.

131. Samoa

Speaker: Mulipola Anarosa Ale Moli'o, Deputy Prime Minister Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN News Takeaway, Samoa Observer

Source status: Near-primary

Asked for climate funding that is "accessible, responsive and free from conditions"; highlighted Samoa's District Development Programme.

132. Saint Kitts and Nevis

Speaker: Geoffrey Hanley, Deputy Prime Minister, as Acting Prime Minister Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: SKNIS releases (government's account), AP photo record

Source status: Primary (own account)

"Those who contributed least must not pay the greatest price"; asked for guarantees that sea-level rise will not erase legal personality, UN membership, nationality or maritime zones; asked financing to move beyond GNI; "the next great divide between nations must not be digital."

133. Bahrain

Speaker: Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, Minister for Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: Arab News, Gulf Daily News, Modern Diplomacy, AP

Source status: Strong

Called it the Gulf's most serious security crisis in decades; the UN needs "not more resolutions, but a greater capacity to implement them." Led Security Council resolution 2817 and tabled a Chapter VII draft on shipping; rejects any fee regime on Hormuz.

134. Azerbaijan

Speaker: Jeyhun Bayramov, Minister for Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: Report.az (ministry text), APA, Trend.Az, AP photo record

Source status: Strong

"We have achieved de facto peace" with Armenia; cites over 90,000 returns, mine-clearance as a national SDG, and nearly 4,000 missing persons needing international support; asked for Security Council reform for developing countries. Pairs with Armenia's entry: both raise missing persons.

135. Kazakhstan

Speaker: Mukhtar Tleuberdi, Minister of Foreign Affairs (corrects the roster, which still listed predecessor Köşerbaev, replaced 2 September) Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: Astana Times (near-primary), Trend.Az

Source status: Near-primary

"The erosion of trust among nations is rapidly reshaping the international order." Noted New START's expiry and the NPT Review Conference's third consecutive failure. Condemned drone attacks on eight Kazakh crude oil export facilities.

136. Mauritania

Speaker: Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug, Minister for Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: Arab News, Mauritanian News Agency, Milli Chronicle, Demócrata

Source status: Strong

Called it a paradox that Palestinians are still denied a physical seat in the Assembly; asked for permanent and non-permanent African Council seats and a review of the UN's financial architecture; asked for shared responsibility on migration.

137. Mexico

Speaker: Roberto Velasco Álvarez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, for President Sheinbaum Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN Web TV (delivery), La Jornada via Mexico Solidarity Media, Anadolu

Source status: Strong

Said the UN faces “a challenge of enormous magnitude” to renew itself; opposed unilateral economic measures against Cuba; added that “in the United Nations, too, it is time for women.” Peace “cannot be decreed or imposed; it's built with social justice.” Answered Trump's cartel claim by citing a 50% fall in homicides over two years (his figure).

Recognises Palestine.

138. Mauritius

Speaker: Ritish (Dhananjay) Ramful, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Cooperation Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: newsmoris.com

Source status: Strong

Declared Chagos sovereignty “non-negotiable,” citing UN resolutions, an ITLOS finding, and an ICJ advisory opinion. Maritime trade is over 90% of energy imports, over 70% of food supply. Called for codifying that sea-level rise “must not erase state sovereignty or legal existence.”

139. Chad

Speaker: Abdelmadjid Abdelrahim Mahamat, Minister of Public Health and Prevention Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: UN Photo, Fox 5 schedule

Source status: Delivery only

Addressed the General Debate; no report of the content found yet.

140. Norway

Speaker: Espen Barth Eide, Minister of Foreign Affairs Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: regjeringen.no (primary, both languages), UN Web TV, gadebate.un.org

Source status: Primary

Described a “triple crisis” facing the UN — normative, financial, institutional. Opened quoting Gramsci: “The old world is dying, and a new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.”

141. Guatemala

Speaker: Carlos Ramiro Martínez Alvarado, Minister of Foreign Affairs (President Arévalo did not attend) Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: Caribbean Bridges (near-primary)

Source status: Near-primary

Called the ICJ hearing on the Belize dispute “more than a procedural milestone,” trusting it will “lay the foundations for a new chapter in relations between Guatemala and Belize.”

142. Sweden

Speaker: Maria Malmer Stenergard, Minister for Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives’ Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: Sweden Abroad (full prepared text, check against delivery), UN Web TV

Source status: Primary

Opened with her grandmother’s story to argue for women’s economic independence. Wants a UN “more effective, more transparent”; UN80; contributions paid in full. Africa having no permanent seat is “neither logical nor fair”; the veto should never block action on serious violations; “for as long as it takes” on Ukraine.

143. Togo

Speaker: Robert Dussey, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the President of the Council Category: Representatives’ Voices Date: 25 September 2026

Sources: allAfrica (French, translation mine), Togo government site, Wikipedia

Source status: Single main source

Said international law guarantees the legitimacy and predictability of power and asked for multilateralism that turns commitments into results. Context: Togo led the “Correct the Map” resolution adopted 4 September by 164 votes to 1 with 6 abstentions.

144. China

Speaker: Han Zheng, Vice President Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN News (near-primary), AP

Source status: Near-primary

Backs UN reform to “strengthen — not cut” existing bodies while “boosting the voice of the Global South.” Did not name Taiwan this year, but invoked General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) on China’s UN representation.

145. Micronesia

Speaker: Aren Palik, Vice President Category: Representatives’ Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Asked for accessible adaptation grants and an operational loss-and-damage fund; endorsed a fossil-fuel non-proliferation treaty. Backed an expanded Council with Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, African seats, and a dedicated non-permanent seat for small island states. Wants the vulnerability index turned into practice.

146. Belize

Speaker: John Briceño, Prime Minister Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript, UN News

Source status: Near-primary

Said reparatory justice is “no longer a marginal whisper”; wants the vulnerability index across concessional finance and debt analysis: “we seek accurate treatment.” Backed Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett for Secretary-General and Taiwan’s participation; used very strong language on Israel and Palestine (his own characterisations). Reported a Guatemalan military aircraft entering its airspace on 23 September with its transponder off, and asked for UN and OAS monitoring before the February 2027 ICJ hearing (Belize’s account; see Guatemala, List 2).

147. Cape Verde

Speaker: Francisco Avelino Vieira de Carvalho, Prime Minister Category: Leaders' Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Said law “cannot be applied in a selective manner”; backed African Council representation under the Ezulwini Consensus; asked that the Secretary-General be chosen on transparency, inclusion, merit and equal opportunity. Will chair the small island states alliance from January 2027 and host the 2034 island states conference.

148. Moldova

Speaker: Vasile Tofan, Prime Minister Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: Radio Moldova, Cotidianul

Source status: Strong

“Countries are not buffer zones. Nations are not bargaining chips.” Called for unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria.

149. Holy See

Speaker: Cardinal Pietro Parolin, Secretary of State, Head of the Delegation, conveying Pope Leo XIV’s greetings Category: Observer Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: Holy See Mission Statement (holyseemission.org, primary, full transcript), UN Web TV, NCR (National Catholic Reporter)

Source status: Primary

Warned strongly against a return to a “diplomacy of force,” appealing for peace and respect for international humanitarian law in Ukraine, Gaza, the West Bank, and other regions in crisis.

Reiterated firm support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “the only viable path to a lasting peace.” On AI and lethal autonomous weapons: “the decision to use lethal force cannot be delegated to opaque or automated processes,” calling for “a culture of negotiation” over “a culture of power.”

Welcomed the US–Israel–Lebanon framework agreement and raised concern about the Rohingya, Sudan, the DRC, Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba–US relations, Nicaragua, and the Caucasus.

150. Laos

Speaker: Thongxavanh Phomvitha, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Opposed unilateral coercive measures and the Cuba blockade; backed full UN membership for Palestine; said graduation from least-developed status must be “a reward, never a punishment”; made unexploded-ordnance clearance a national SDG.

151. Cambodia

Speaker: Sokhonn Prak, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Said the Charter “does not prescribe one standard for the powerful and another for the less powerful.” Gave Cambodia’s account of the Thailand dispute (20,000+ civilians unable to return; UNCLOS conciliation after the 2001 MOU was ended). Raised online scam centres as a transnational-crime problem.

152. Russia

Speaker: Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN News (near-primary), RT, Sputnik

Source status: Near-primary

Called for a new Eurasian “security architecture.” Accused Western countries of “force and double standards.” Vowed the war in Ukraine would be “carried through to the end.”

153. Philippines

Speaker: Maria Teresa Lazaro, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Said a Hormuz incident killed Filipino seafarers, that UNCLOS is “the constitution of the oceans” and the 2016 award is final and binding; asked for enforceable AI governance, a UNCLOS-based framework for critical maritime infrastructure, Council reform, and “a woman Secretary-General.”

154. Cuba

Speaker: Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, Minister for Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN-hosted ASR transcript

Source status: Near-primary

Said Cuba faces a US energy blockade since January 2026 with about 7,000 containers stranded; “Cuba is not a threat. The blockade is a threat.” Open to dialogue without preconditions. These are the Cuban government’s claims.

155. Saudi Arabia

Speaker: Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN News (near-primary), SPA, Express Tribune, Asharq Al-Awsat

Source status: Near-primary / primary (SPA)

Named “flagrant Iranian attacks.” Called for freedom of navigation across Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden simultaneously — the first voice to name all four chokepoints together.

156. Singapore

Speaker: Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister for Foreign Affairs Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: mfa.gov.sg (primary), Anadolu, CNA

Source status: Primary

AI capabilities are “developing faster than the world’s understanding of the risks.” “Singapore believes that the multilateral system... still remains the best way to uphold global peace.”

157. Iceland

Speaker: Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir, Minister for Foreign Affairs Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: AP (multi-syndicated: Boston Globe, Yahoo, ABC News)

Source status: Strong

Directly rebutted Netanyahu’s “moral cowards” line from the day before: “To me, moral cowards are those leaders around the world who refuse to sit down and negotiate a just and lasting peace.”

158. Nicaragua

Speaker: Valdrack Jaentschke, Co-Minister of Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives’ Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: Canal 4, teleSUR English, La Prensa

Source status: Strong on themes; sources differ in alignment

Spoke of peace, dignity and solidarity, external interference as a cause of regional instability, solidarity with Cuba, and BRICS and a multipolar order. La Prensa says he did not address recent constitutional changes (their observation).

159. India

Speaker: S. Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister (PM Modi did not attend) Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: PTI, IANS

Source status: Near-primary

“Countries far from conflicts are being penalised for no fault of theirs. Those most impacted often have the least say.” “The case for reformed multilateralism is getting stronger day by day.”

160. Germany

Speaker: Johann Wadephul, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chancellor Merz did not attend) Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: auswaertiges-amt.de (primary), Anadolu

Source status: Primary

“The UN Security Council, in its current form, is unable to fulfill its central mission.” Joint statement with Brazil, India, Japan (G4).

161. Djibouti

Speaker: Abdoukader Houssein Omar, Minister of Foreign Affairs Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: Arab News (two pieces)

Source status: Strong

A Houthi offensive near Bab al-Mandab has driven a Yemeni refugee influx “Djibouti alone can’t meet.” Named Bab al-Mandab “a major geopolitical and economic issue for regional and global stability” — speaking as a direct recipient of the consequences, not just a commentator.

162. Malaysia

Speaker: Mohamad Hasan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: Malay Mail (multiple), Free Malaysia Today, Newswav

Source status: Strong

“Again and again, the collective will of this assembly has encountered the silencing effect of the veto. Malaysia will speak plainly: We are sick of it.” Called for veto abolition, ceasefire, full Palestinian UN membership. “We are the global majority... we must help shape those choices.”

163. Oman

Speaker: Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, Minister for Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives’ Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: Reuters via Al Arabiya, Fox News live blog, photo record

Source status: Strong

Called for “self-restraint” from all sides and offered to mediate; reaffirmed efforts to safeguard Hormuz navigation and asked all parties to cooperate with them.

164. Tunisia

Speaker: Mohamed Ali Nafti, Minister for Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN News Takeaway

Source status: Thin

Asked that irregular migration stop being treated mainly as a security issue and that causes (conflict, poverty, unemployment) be addressed.

165. Canada

Speaker: Anita Anand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking for PM Mark Carney Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: canada.ca (primary, full text), UN News, CBC, CTV

Source status: Primary

"The tide does not wait. You must move with it." Quoted historian Margaret MacMillan: "we have arrived in a new age of disorder." "State sovereignty — the cornerstone of the UN Charter — has been treated with disdain." Canada's answer: "greater strategic autonomy" among middle powers; defended the ICC.

166. Jamaica

Speaker: Kamina Johnson Smith, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: UN Journal/gadebate.un.org (delivery confirmed), Jamaica Observer, RJR News

Source status: Delivery confirmed; floor-text quotes pending

Amid public questions over the Netanyahu walkout: "We are not a walk-out country." Priorities: development financing, peace and security, climate resilience, multilateral reform.

167. Zambia

Speaker: Mulambo Haimbe, Minister of Foreign Affairs (President Hichilema stayed home to cut state travel costs) Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: Chronicle Online, gadebate.un.org, ZNBC, Lusaka Times

Source status: Strong

Framed Zambia as peaceful and open for investment under the "Grow Zambia Agenda."

168. Indonesia

Speaker: Sugiono, Minister of Foreign Affairs (President Prabowo did not attend) Date: 26 September 2026

Sources: ANTARA News (near-primary)

Source status: Near-primary

"International institutions are only as strong as the principles if the world is willing to defend and uphold international law." Announced a Security Council bid for 2029–2030.

169. Cameroon

Speaker: Foreign Minister, for President Paul Biya Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: The Zambian Observer

Source status: Strong

"Financing for development should not be considered as some kind of alms or kindness." Called for reform of the international financial architecture, and addressed the Northwest/Southwest conflict, AfCFTA, terrorism, peacekeeping, Security Council reform, climate change, and AI.

170. Mali

Speaker: Abdoulaye Diop, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, for transitional President Gen. Assimi Goïta Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: Maliexpress, Afrikinfos-Mali, AfrikMag (French; translations mine)

Source status: Strong, current sources

Cited violations of international law and the "selective application" of international rules, weakening trust in multilateral institutions.

Called for lifting of unilateral coercive measures, and for reform of the multilateral system. Defended the strategic choices of Mali and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) confederation, linking the Sahel security crisis to external intervention — closely echoing Niger's entry, both AES members using the platform to defend sovereignty.

171. El Salvador

Speaker: Alexandra Hill Tinoco, Minister of Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: AP (via WRAL), part of AP's "lesser-heard voices" roundup of the final day

Source status: Strong

A short, pointed line, with no further context given in the source: "Enough with the bureaucracy!"

172. Malawi

Speaker: Dr. George Chabonda, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: MBC (Malawi Broadcasting Corporation), Malawi24, Nyasa Times (two pieces), The Maravi Post

Source status: Strong, multi-outlet

Public faith in multilateralism is "collapsing under the weight of unfulfilled promises"; the UN must move from a "forum of speeches to an engine of delivery."

Called for full capitalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund, comprehensive debt relief and restructuring, Security Council reform with permanent African representation with full veto privileges, a legally binding Pandemic Treaty, and fair, inclusive AI governance.

Nyasa Times reports his office had to publicly clarify he was not actually in the hall during Netanyahu's address, after viral social media images wrongly suggested he'd stayed seated — a useful caution on how unreliable informal walkout reporting has been.

173. Benin

Speaker: Corinne Amori Brunet, Minister of Foreign Affairs (currently chairing the AU Peace and Security Council) Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026 (spoke immediately after the three AES states — Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger)

Sources: BeninWebTV (two pieces), Le Matinal, Les 4 Vérités

Source status: Delivery confirmed with themes

Carried “the voice of security cooperation and multilateralism,” placing inclusivity, conflict prevention, and West African stabilization at the centre. Benin formally joined international conventions on transboundary watercourses and international lakes during the week.

174. Sri Lanka

Speaker: Vijitha Herath, Minister of Foreign Affairs (President Dissanayaka did not attend) Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: Colombo Telegraph (full text, primary), South Asian Herald, adaderana.lk (two pieces), ednews.net

Source status: Primary

Trust erosion reflected in “unresolved conflicts, humanitarian crises that outpace available resources... and technological advances that are moving faster than governance.” Welcomed the UN Security Council’s framework on Gaza (resolution 2803, 17 November 2025) and urged all parties to uphold it. Said Gaza recovery and reconstruction “must be an early priority” and backed a Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders.

Cited climate justice, referencing the Nepal/China floods that killed over 1,400 people, and asked for UN reform that narrows the gap between developed and developing countries. Noted Sri Lanka’s reclassification to upper-middle-income status by the World Bank.

175. Algeria

Speaker: Ahmed Attaf, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: Arab News (two pieces), AP (via news4jax, WSLS), SANA, Middle East Monitor/Anadolu, SPS

Source status: Strong, multi-outlet

“What confidence can remain in international law when the aggressor is granted the right to self-defense while the victim is required to justify even the right to survive?” Said regional conflict is “eroding the boundaries” of acceptable conduct in international relations.

Said Israel is failing to uphold the Gaza ceasefire in effect since October 2025, continuing to kill civilians despite it — independent corroboration that the ceasefire remains fragile and only partly observed. Also accused Israel of attacks on Syria and Lebanon and of efforts “to divide Somalia.”

Called Security Council reform “no longer an institutional luxury” but “a necessity,” asking to end “selectivity and double standards.” Backed Sahrawi self-determination in Western Sahara, welcoming direct Morocco–Polisario talks.

176. Sudan

Speaker: Mohieldin Salim Ahmed Ibrahim, Minister of Foreign Affairs (substituting for Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, whose US visa application was rejected) Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: UN News (near-primary), GlobalSecurity.org, allAfrica

Source status: Near-primary

Called the US visa denial “deeply regrettable” and a violation of sovereign equality, asking the UN to formally document the incident against the 1947 Headquarters Agreement — the second visa-denial case in the record, after Palestine.

Repeatedly blamed “the terrorist militia” (the RSF) for the civil war since April 2023: “Silence regarding the atrocities... is not only shameful, unethical and complicit, it is a betrayal of the civilian victims.”

Asked for “no imposed solutions” to Sudan’s conflict, and for Security Council reform with two permanent African seats.

177. United Arab Emirates

Speaker: Khalifa Shaheen Al Marar, Minister of State Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: WAM (UAE’s state news agency, primary), Arab News (two pieces), The National, Gulf News

Source status: Primary

Named Iran directly over its “occupation of the three Emirati islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa,” calling for a peaceful settlement “through direct negotiations or by recourse to the International Court of Justice.” Also raised threats to navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

Asked for freedom of navigation and right of transit passage “for the safe flow of supply chains, trade and energy”; a permanent, unconditional ceasefire in Sudan; support for the Gaza peace framework; and reform of “international multilateral institutions, including the Security Council.”

Listed active UAE mediation efforts in Yemen, Libya, the Sahel, the DRC, Myanmar, Haiti, and Ukraine.

178. North Korea

Speaker: Kim Son Gyong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: AP (via CTV News, NBC News, US News, CP24, ClickOrlando)

Source status: Strong, multi-syndicated

Notably mild by Pyongyang’s standards — AP specifically flagged the absence of direct threats. Described “a harsh reality rampant with unprecedented mutual distrust and confrontation” and said the UN “still fails to recover from functional paralysis owing to the high-handedness and unilateralism of a handful of countries.”

“Multilateralism and multipolarization have emerged as an irresistible aspiration and trend of the times based on justice and equity.” Framed the DPRK’s nuclear deterrent as “the absolute might... to safeguard the sovereignty, security and peace against aggression.” Called Japan “an A-class war criminal.”

179. Antigua and Barbuda

Speaker: Amb. Walton Alfonso Webson, reading PM Gaston Browne's written statement Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026 (reported by the source as 29 September, a discrepancy)

Sources: Caribbean Bridges (diplomatic newsletter), ABS TV Radio Antigua & Barbuda, Antigua News

Source status: Strong

For small island states, UN reform "must be judged by one test: does the organisation serve people better?"

In bilateral talks with the DRC's prime minister, Browne introduced María Fernanda Espinosa (former UNGA President, Ecuador) as having Antigua and Barbuda's full endorsement for Secretary-General — a fifth named candidate in the record, alongside Rodrigues-Birkett, Macky Sall, Olara Otunnu, and Ivonne Baki.

180. Grenada

Speaker: Ingrid Jackson, Permanent Representative to the UN, for PM Dickon Mitchell Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: Times Caribbean Online, citing Caribbean Bridges' analysis

Source status: Strong

"We are also laboratories of resilience" — small island states as sources of solutions, not just climate-risk countries. Called for resilience to be financed before disaster strikes, and for wider use of the Multidimensional Vulnerability Index.

Raised constructive engagement on Cuba, criticizing the embargo's effects while saying Cuban reforms are also needed. A sixth voice backing Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett for Secretary-General.

181. South Sudan

Speaker: Cecilia Adout Majok Adeng, Permanent Representative to the UN Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: UN News

Source status: Near-primary

"The ballot must replace the bullets." Committed to holding elections in December to conclude the transition, and called for all sanctions, including the arms embargo, to be lifted.

Thanked UNMISS and honoured fallen peacekeepers, but said South Sudan does not want to remain "indefinitely dependent" on international peacekeeping, asking instead for investment in its own police, judiciary, education, and healthcare.

182. Denmark

Speaker: Christina Markus Lassen, Permanent Representative to the UN Category: Representatives' Voices Date: 28 September 2026

Sources: AP (via ClickOrlando, ClickOnDetroit, WSLS)

Source status: Strong, multi-syndicated

On the trilateral Arctic security agreement with the US and Greenland (signed 22 September, announced by Trump from the floor that day): it "strengthens the defense of

Greenland, the NATO area, and the American continent” and is “good for Greenland, for Denmark, for the United States, for NATO and Europe, and for international peace and security.”

AP notes the pact keeps Greenland part of Denmark, easing tensions over Trump’s repeated calls for the island to become part of the US, and would still apply if Greenland eventually chose independence.

183. Costa Rica

Speaker: Boris Vasir Marchegiani Carrero, Permanent Representative to the UN — stepped in after Foreign Minister Manuel Tovar was fired days before the scheduled address, over his handling of a “Shield of the Americas” meeting invitation the Presidency called “negligent” Category: Representatives’ Voices Date: 28 September 2026 (14th of 21 speakers that day)

Sources: Tico Times (two pieces), AP photo record

Source status: Delivery confirmed; floor-speech content not yet located

A genuinely unusual case — Costa Rica lost its foreign minister mid-week and sent its UN ambassador instead, distinct from every other substitute-speaker case in the record, which involved planned absences.

184. Myanmar

Status: A. Confirmed: did not address the floor, quiet Credentials Committee arrangement keeps Kyaw Moe Tun off speaker list

185. Afghanistan

Status: A. Confirmed: did not address the floor (6th consecutive year), cited technical reason amid credentials dispute

Not obtained (186–198)

Thirteen names on the roster that the search could not confirm one way or the other, despite repeated attempts. Listed here by name so the final count of 198 has no silent gap.

#	Country	Note
186	Liechtenstein	No content found
187	Brunei	No content found
188	Tajikistan	No content found
189	San Marino	No content found
190	Belarus	No 2026 content found
191	Gabon	No content found
192	São Tomé and Príncipe	No content found
193	Burkina Faso	No content found
194	Eritrea	No content found
195	Republic of the Congo	No 2026 content found (only prior years, election background)
196	New Zealand	Speaker confirmed as PR Victoria Hallum; no floor content found
197	Turkmenistan	Pre-session priorities briefing logged; floor speech (PR Wepa Hajjýew) not located
198	Vanuatu	Speaker confirmed as PR Odo Tevi; no 2026 floor content found

Closing note

The vault stands at 185 of 198, named and sourced, and 13 named and not obtained. Nothing further is sought. This is the final figure for the report.

Annexure-D: The Seven-Domain Search

This annex documents the search referenced in “Why This Report Is Needed.” The question tested in each domain: does a working mechanism exist that can reliably act when a consequence crosses the border of the state, sector or institution where it began? Each entry follows the same structure: the mechanism built for the job, what removed or limited its power to compel, the documented reform or completion effort, the available workaround and its limit, and sources.

A1. Peace and security

Working mechanism

The UN Security Council, the Charter's own instrument for maintaining international peace and security (Art. 24).

What removed or limited its power to compel

Any permanent member's veto blocks action outright. In 2025, permanent members cast vetoes blocking action on both Gaza and Ukraine - the same year UCDP recorded the highest number of state-based conflicts in a series that begins in 1946.

Reform or completion effort on record

Security Council reform has been on the General Assembly's agenda since resolution 47/62 in December 1992 — 34 years. Documented efforts include the African Union's Ezulwini Consensus (2005), the ACT Group's Code of Conduct (signed by 121 states), the 2024 Pact for the Future, and active 2026 proposals (a “Double Veto” system; an atrocity-crime carve-out from the veto). None has been adopted; any change to the veto itself requires ratification by all five permanent members.

Available workaround, and its limit

The 1950 “Uniting for Peace” mechanism lets the General Assembly act if the Council is blocked, but its resolutions carry no binding legal effect. A 2022 General Assembly procedure requires an automatic meeting within 10 days of any P5 veto, to scrutinise and comment — no binding obligation follows.

Sources: UN Charter Art. 24, 27; UN General Assembly resolution 47/62 (1992) and 76/262 (2022); CIVICUS Lens, “UN Security Council: reform or irrelevance” (Feb 2026); Foreign Policy, “Reforming the Security Council for a Stronger United Nations” (Sept 2025); ISS African Futures, “UN Security Council Reform”; UCDP 2025 data (published June 2026).

A2. Trade

Working mechanism

The WTO Appellate Body, the system's binding second-tier review for trade disputes.

What removed or limited its power to compel

Unable to hear a single appeal since its final seats fell vacant in December 2019 — without it, no final ruling can be made in any appealed case.

Reform or completion effort on record

In 2022, 127 of the WTO's members put forward 61 separate proposals to restore the appointment process; the United States has not supported dispute-settlement reform to date, and all 61 proposals did not proceed. WTO members committed to a fully functioning system “by 2024”; it remains non-functional as of this report.

Available workaround, and its limit

A plurilateral workaround, the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), binds only its opted-in members (61 as of 2024). Where retaliation has been authorized — in only seven disputes across the WTO's history — it is widely assessed as too weak and unpredictable to compel compliance.

Sources: *Congressional Research Service, “Dispute Settlement in the WTO and U.S. Trade Agreements” (2024); Wikipedia/WTO primary text on dispute settlement; European Commission, “WTO dispute settlement”; Hofstra Law Review, “Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis”; WTO, World Trade Report 2026 executive summary.*

A3. Sanctions and export controls

Working mechanism

UN Security Council sanctions authority, and, regionally, coordinated multilateral sanctions regimes (e.g. the EU's).

What removed or limited its power to compel

The same veto structure as peace and security. Since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Council has been unable to act on sanctions matters even where the underlying issue is unrelated to Ukraine — in June 2022 it failed to adopt a resolution strengthening North Korea sanctions after new ballistic-missile launches.

Reform or completion effort on record

No dedicated reform track exists separate from the broader Security Council reform effort documented in A1. The EU's own 20th Russia sanctions package took from 6 February to 23 April 2026 to adopt, after two member states withdrew their opposition — a reform-by-negotiation process required for every new package under EU unanimity rules.

Available workaround, and its limit

The General Assembly's 2022 veto-review procedure (as in A1) produces scrutiny and comment, not a binding sanctions outcome. Unilateral sanctions by individual blocs proceed in parallel but are not mutually binding — the same period saw the UK and EU lower an oil price cap while the US held it unchanged.

Sources: Global Investigations Review, “The Guide to Sanctions,” 6th ed.; UN General Assembly resolution 76/262 (2022); EU Council sanctions-package adoption record, Feb–Apr 2026; IRPJ, “Long-Term Consequences of the Use of Veto Power by UNSC Permanent Members” (Dec 2025).

A4. Climate

Working mechanism

The Paris Agreement's Implementation and Compliance Committee (PAICC), established under Article 15 to address non-compliance with binding procedural obligations (e.g. submitting Nationally Determined Contributions).

What removed or limited its power to compel

Non-enforcement is written into the Agreement's own decision text: the Committee “shall neither function as an enforcement or dispute settlement mechanism, nor impose penalties or sanctions, and shall respect national sovereignty” (Decision 20/CMA.1). Achievement of a country's own emissions target is not itself a legally binding or enforceable commitment.

Reform or completion effort on record

The Committee's strongest available measure — a formal public finding naming a government in breach — has never been used; in 2023 it chose a softer report even after documented filing failures. Proposals exist to strengthen the Committee's scope and to formalize climate litigation using attribution studies, but none has been adopted as of this report.

Available workaround, and its limit

The Enhanced Transparency Framework relies on public “naming and shaming” through peer-reviewed reporting, with no penalty attached. A 2026 ICJ advisory opinion found the 1.5°C target legally binding, but the same UN General Assembly resolution that requested the opinion had to separately ask the Secretary-General to report on “advancing compliance” with it — the ruling itself created no enforcement mechanism.

Sources: Climate Change News, “Paris Agreement committee snubbed over missing NDC ...” (May 2026); Legal Response International, “Options for legal remedies and procedural responses to non-compliance with the Paris Agreement”; Decision 20/CMA.1; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Q&A: Understanding Paris Agreement NDCs”; Ecological Law Institute, “Paris Agreement 2026: Current Status, Legal Obligations” (June 2026).

A5. Health

Working mechanism

The WHO Pandemic Agreement, adopted by consensus on 20 May 2025 — only the second legally binding health treaty in WHO's 77-year history, built in direct response to gaps exposed by COVID-19.

What removed or limited its power to compel

The Agreement cannot open for signature until a separate, legally binding annex on pathogen access and benefit-sharing is negotiated and adopted — originally scheduled for the 79th World Health Assembly in May 2026. Ratification by at least 60 parties is required before the Agreement takes legal effect at all. During negotiation, the word “compliance” was removed from the text and replaced with “monitoring implementation.”

Reform or completion effort on record

Negotiation of the pathogen-sharing annex, the precondition for signature, remains an active, unresolved process as of this report — more than a year after the framework's own adoption.

Available workaround, and its limit

The 2005 International Health Regulations, revised and in force since September 2025, run in parallel and impose separate binding obligations, but do not resolve the Pandemic Agreement's own sequencing bottleneck.

Sources: NCBI/WHO Bulletin, “Implementation of the WHO Pandemic Agreement” (Sept 2025); Wiley, “The Pandemic Agreement: What's Next?”; WHO, “WHO Pandemic Agreement” overview page; House of Commons Library, “What is the proposed WHO Pandemic Preparedness Treaty?” (July 2026); CEPI, “The Pandemic Agreement — What it is, and what it is not.”

A6. Education

Working mechanism

No binding global mechanism exists. The nearest instruments are the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 4) and UNESCO's convening and monitoring role.

What removed or limited its power to compel

The SDG framework is not legally binding and carries no enforcement mechanism by design; compliance rests entirely on voluntary national reporting.

Reform or completion effort on record

The global out-of-school population fell by only 1% over nearly ten years to 2024. Only 18% of SDG targets remain on track for 2030, with SDG 4 lagging particularly behind. UNESCO's own 2026–27 regular education budget was cut 24% following the exit of a major funder.

Available workaround, and its limit

The Education World Forum, the field's main global gathering, produces no binding decisions and operates through closed-door, bilateral conversation. UNESCO's Transforming Education Summit+4 (10 July 2026) is billed as potentially producing binding ministerial commitments — not yet realized as of this report.

Sources: UNESCO, “Fragmenting consensus: The multipolar turn in global education governance” (Feb 2026); UNESCO, “International cooperation on education in times of global inequality” (June 2026); Springer, “Global governance of education: The SDGs as a product and mechanism?”; IENSTITU, “Education World Forum 2026 Analysis”; UNESCO 2026 GEM Report.

A7. Poverty and the developed/developing divide

Working mechanism

The UN's Financing for Sustainable Development framework, most recently the 2025 Sevilla Commitment, intended to mobilize the \$4 trillion needed annually to meet the SDGs by 2030.

What removed or limited its power to compel

No enforcement mechanism compels the financing pledged; delivery depends entirely on the voluntary action of contributing states.

Reform or completion effort on record

The UN's own April 2026 Financing for Sustainable Development Report states the gap is widening, not closing: Official Development Assistance fell 6% in 2024 and a further 23% in 2025, developing-country debt servicing hit a 20-year high, and tariffs on Least Developed Country exports rose from 9% to 28% in a single year. The UN Secretary-General: “the global financial architecture was created for a world that no longer exists. It cannot address the challenges faced today by developing countries.”

Available workaround, and its limit

UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board convenes to discuss inequality but has no financing or enforcement authority of its own; UNCTAD confirms inequality between countries is deepening, not narrowing.

Sources: UN DESA / UN News, “Development finance gap risks reversing decades of progress” (April 2026); UnSDG, same report; DevelopmentAid.org coverage of the 2026 Financing for Sustainable Development Report; UNCTAD, “Rising inequality a blight on our development hopes”; UNCTAD, “Financing for development: Reforming global systems to drive progress.”

What the seven domains show, held together

Domain	Mechanism	Disabled / limited by	Reform effort, documented	Workaround produces
Peace & security	UN Security Council	P5 veto	34 yrs, unresolved (1992–)	Non-binding recommendation
Trade	WTO Appellate Body	Vacant since 2019 (1 member's block)	61 proposals blocked, 2022	Opt-in-only arbitration
Sanctions	UNSC sanctions authority	Same veto structure	None separate from A1	Scrutiny, no binding outcome
Climate	Paris Compliance Committee	Non-punishment written into treaty text	Never uses strongest tool available	Naming/shaming, no penalty
Health	WHO Pandemic Agreement	Sequencing precondition unmet; “compliance” removed from text	Annex negotiation ongoing, 1+ yr	Parallel IHR, doesn't resolve gap
Education	None binding exists	Voluntary reporting only, by design	1% reduction in a decade	Closed-door, non-binding forum
Poverty / development	UN Financing for Development framework	Voluntary contribution only	Gap widening per UN's own 2026 report	Discussion body, no financing authority

Seven institutions, built at different times, for different purposes, by different people, produce the same structure independently. That recurrence is the finding this annex documents; the reading of what it requires is developed in the body of this report.

Annexure-E: Decade of Secretarial Diagnostics

To establish a baseline of data transparency and institutional accountability, this report logs a ten-year record of official opening addresses delivered by United Nations Secretaries-General. The record shows a consistent diagnostic trajectory:

2026 (António Guterres): “The fault lines in our world are widening. Cracks have become canyons... We see a world in pieces... The level of impunity in our world is politically indefensible and morally intolerable.” He added: “We cannot effectively address problems as they are if institutions don’t reflect the world as it is.”

2025 (António Guterres): “The global financial architecture was created for a world that no longer exists and cannot address the challenges faced today.” He described the drift as an environment where “cooperation over chaos is being cast aside.”

2021 (António Guterres, ‘Our Common Agenda’): “We face a stark and urgent choice: a breakdown or a breakthrough.” The Common Agenda record itself acknowledged that global risks have become networked, demanding an integrated response that legacy systems are not equipped to run.

2017 (António Guterres, initial term audit): the Secretary-General’s first operational diagnostic concluded that the international development and security apparatus was “too fragmented when coherence was required” and “too internally competitive when collaboration was mandatory.”

Strategic Impact Analysis

This decade-long tracking provides enough proof that the international system has spent years defining the boundaries of the Coherence Deficit. The leadership of the United Nations has consistently documented that the harm is networked, while the defensive machinery remains departmental. To that judgement and predicament, the Humanity 7.0 Protocol Stack is being made available as the complete architectural blueprint for nations, industries, institutions, sectors including telecommunications, businesses, transmedia and individuals across borders.

Annexure-F: Additional sources, disclaimers, acknowledgements, thank you note

Strategic References (Verified Global Records)

UN Regular Budget Framework: United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Committee, 2026 Program Budget database.

Global Conflict Demographics: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) global tracking dataset, 2026 baseline.

Macro Military Expenditure: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, April 2026 release.

Economic Risk Metrics: Lloyd's Geopolitical Fragmentation Index & WEF Global Risks Report 2026.

Operational Core Design: DT TRIO LABS @ GVLN Peaceland, Inc. Systemic Research Archive. <https://www.7girgoldenbridge.com/>

<https://www.kxbbioverse.com/>

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

This UNGA 2026 World Report is the coordinated working discipline and in alignment with self-governed standards of the HAM collaboration with the named contributing platforms: Sara Gana, Claude (Anthropic), ChatGPT (OpenAI), Grok (xAI), Gemini (Google) and Srini Gopaluni presented by DT TRIO LABS of GVLN Peaceland, Inc. (dba KXB BIOVERSE) a New York Incorporation. The ascending publicly voiced concerns around Artificial Intelligence as a potential threat is treated and incorporated natively as a functional design collective here. Thus the HAM finds its collective voice through its working discipline here to make it as humanity's collaborative spirit.

HAM - Human, AI, and Machine intelligences coordinating as one accountable process

Chapter 10.

Closing and Thank You Note

Two things are missing in the voices this report recorded: governance that performs and architecture that works. Artificial Intelligence and supply-chain disruption deepened both concerns in 2026.

Increasingly, we have noted that peace that can be traded could hold world affairs, and humanity itself, in a coherent governance accord.

- Peace is neither surrender nor absence of war and it is not the private virtue of monks, saints, or dreamers.
- Peace is a functional requirement of world affairs. It is the condition under which goods, law, and human life can still move when a shock does not stop at the border.
- Trade spoken alone as sentiment of national need already failed to hold capability and exposure together.
- Pure peace as mandate, spoken alone, breaks on contact with the year.

What must be held is the pair:

peace that can be traded, trade that does not become a weapon with no floor.

Split that pair and the standard splits with it.

Responsibility is not a private virtue. It is a functional requirement of any system whose actors are free.

Nations will not put a stamp on a holding architecture
because it is offered, or because it is kind.

They come to the table when the cost of staying fragmented overtakes the cost of a bounded rule.

Visible cost does that work. Necessity finishes it.

That makes commerce more than an economic activity.

That is not a moral story. It is how a shared road is governed.

This report made a point that commerce is one of the first operating grounds on which fragmentation becomes impossible to ignore.

And GCIGS, the global coherent integrated governance standard. is presented as that operating ground for nations and their leadership that holds their entire economic portfolios both at domestic and global level. As and when adopted, businesses, industries, institutions, sectors, borders, media, individuals, regions, continents would come under Humanity 7.0 ecosystem that is governed by its protocol compliances and council of their own members.

Once again that name, here in the closing note, becomes a reminder –

Humanity 7.0 = Interoperable Sovereignty = वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्

ONE EARTH ACROSS SOVEREIGN BORDER LINES

The rule is for transactional safety on the surface everyone must use. GCIGS compliance protocols follow the same simple principle as the rules of a shared road. A shared road is usable because its rules apply to everyone who chooses to travel on it. You may dislike the rule, but when you want to use the road, you abide by the rule.

And this is the simplest and most direct safety precaution for humans at all levels, from governments to individuals and all commerce in between. Conflicts and Wars have ruled the human world for centuries. The United Nations General Assembly this year is an open cry of 193 nations for peace in the world, for human dignity and respect for nations, a longing for shared responsibilities with equitable growth and the need for their voices to be heard.


When humans have tested many systems that have gifted them with fragmented world on multiple accounts, Humanity 7.0 is one more that comes their way, with the potential to make an impact the world would want to keep.

Humanity 7.0 = Interoperable Sovereignty = वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्
ONE EARTH ACROSS SOVEREIGN BORDER LINES
the global operational standards architecture
Powered by 7GIR-OS, G-Trade, GCIGS, BIOME

And the proposition is waiting to be recognized and adopted by governments (GCIGS – DoNB), institutions (G-Trade), enterprise (7GIR-OS) and civilization as a whole (BIOME).

The recorded voices of 81st General Assembly of the United Nations in this report is a tribute to those who delivered them: Kudos to every delegation, interpreter and UN staff members who carried the annual session with steadiness and diplomacy.

Thank you from the HAM Team.



As the deeply entrenched roots of old systems are forcefully uprooted, a raw, developing canopy of civilizational infrastructure rises majestically above a magnificent golden bridge. Out of this twisting trunk bursts the high-speed engine of 7GIR-OS, G-Trade, GCIGS, and BIOME, slicing seamlessly across ancient geopolitical divisions. This momentum initiates Humanity 7.0 and Interoperable Sovereignty, binding one earth across sovereign border lines under the eternal truth of वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्.

